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Dannin: Contracting Mediation: The Impact of Different Statutory Regimes

CONTRACTING MEDIATION:
THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT STATUTORY
REGIMES
Ellen J. Dannin*
The United States is making a commitment to increased and institutionalized use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), most often
based on the claim that it is superior to and certainly different from
traditional litigation. Mediation in particular, in the popular view, is
supposed to be user-friendly, nonadversarial, and conducive to optimal,
wholistic resolutions.2 Litigation, in contrast, is supposed to be slow,
costly to all, impersonal, formal, legalistic, and incapable of giving
complete or satisfactory resolutions This implicitly assumes that ADR
(mediation and arbitration) and litigation are discrete processes, each
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, San Diego, California. B.A. University of Michigan; J.D. University of Michigan. An earlier version of this article was delivered at
the 1998 Law and Society Conference, Snowmass Village, Colorado, June 4-7, 1998. This research
is supported in part by a grant from the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and support from California Western School of Law, University of Waikato, and Victoria University of Wellington. The
Dan Long Library, Wellington, New Zealand, and Brian Easton have assisted by providing primary documents. I would like to thank Jim Atleson, Gary Chaison, and Richard Lempert for their
suggestions.
1. Cf. Glen Sato, Comment, The Mediator-Lawyer: Implications for the Practice of Law
and One Argumentfor ProfessionalResponsibility Guidance-A Proposalfor Some Ethical Considerations,34 UCLA L. REv. 507, 507-08 (1986). This, of course, is not the case among serious
sociolegal scholars. They have long made sophisticated critiques of ADR and its use by dominant
groups as a method of constructing and promoting ideologies. For an overview of critiques and
debates see Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, IdeologicalProduction:The Making of
Community Mediation, 22 L. & Soc'Y REv. 709, 709-14 (1988); George Pavlich, The Power of
Community Mediation: Governmentand Formationof Self-Identity, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 707, 70915 (1996); see also MARTHA MINOW, PARTIAL JusTICE: LAW AND MINORITIES IN THE FATE OF
LAW 15,21 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds., 1991).
2. See, e.g., Helen Elkiss, Alternatives to Arbitration:Are Unions Ready for Change?, 48
LAB. L.J. 675 (Nov. 1997).
3. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way":
Litigation,Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.. 824, 825-26, 830 (describing criticisms of litigation and exploring their dimensions); Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics,29 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 323, 323-24 (1995).
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with uniform and intrinsic natures.4 This, in turn, suggests an assumption that they retain these qualities under all circumstances. In this
popularized, Manichean and romanticized view, ADR, particularly mediation, possesses uniformly positive qualities and litigation uniformly
negative ones.5 This paradigm has come to infuse our current system of
justice, including the courts,6 the legislature, 7 and even legal education.8
The pervasive acceptance of this viewpoint has serious consequences
for how justice is to be administered in the United States for the foreseeable future.
This development is odd, given that there has long existed convinc4. Carrie Menkel-Meadow argues that U.S. scholarship treats ADR as if it were a monolith:
Recent scholarship on this subject continues to treat "adjudication" on the one hand and
"ADR" on the other as if they were uniform processes, even where they may "meld"
into each other. Modem scholars continue to conflate all ADR processes (even when
describing them as different, they continue to attribute the same qualifies to all forms of
ADR) just as they view adjudication as if it were the same in a local small claims court
in a rural community and a federal district court in a major city (not to mention the differences in "adjudicatory" effects of such rulings as summary judgment).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense
of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663, 2666 n.18 (1995).
5. See Wissler, supra note 3, at 323-24; Rowe, supra note 3, at 830; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 2666.
6. Compare the United States Supreme Court's strongly pro-arbitration decision in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25-28 (1991), which provided a strong endorsement
for arbitration in non-union employment disputes with Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998), which takes a less expansive view of arbitration, essentially reaffirming Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49, 52 (1974), as to whether arbitration agreements in
collective bargaining agreements are effective waivers of statutory rights.
The majority of state courts provide for ADR. See Calvin Morrill, Institutional Change and Interstitial Emergence: The Growth of Alternate Dispute Resolution in American Law, 1965-1995
(May 1998) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
7. See Steven H. Goldberg, "Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came In." A Trial Lawyer's
Searchfor Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 653, 665. On April 21, 1998, the
House of Representatives voted 405-2 for the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, which
requires all federal district courts to authorize the use of ADR in all civil actions, and on October
10, 1998, it was passed by both houses. See CongressApproves Bill Requiring Courts to Authorize
Alternative Dispute Resolution, LAB. REL. WEEKLY 2218 (Oct. 20, 1998); Alternative Dispute
Resolution: House Passes Bill Requiring District Courts to Use Dispute Resolution in Civil Actions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at D-21 (Apr. 23, 1998). In August 1997, the Massachusetts
Committee Against Discrimination began referring parties to ADR because parties were not voluntarily choosing it. See Massachusetts Discrimination Commission Will Push Harderfor ADR hi
Some Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 198, at D-25 (Oct. 14, 1997).
8. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 658-59; Sally Engle Merry, Disputing Without Culture,
100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2057 n.7, 2060 (1987) (book review). Anyone teaching in a law school
today cannot escape noticing ADR's influence on legal education, both in individual course offerings and in the content and approach of other courses. See, e.g., RICHARD MARCUs, Er AL., CIVIL
PROCEDuRE: A MODERN APPROACH (2d ed. 1995) (introducing alternatives to litigation and discussing ADR). A decade ago this was not the case. See Sato, supra note 1, at 507 n.2; Morrill, supra note 6.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol17/iss1/2

2

Dannin: Contracting Mediation: The Impact of Different Statutory Regimes
1999]

ContractingMediation

ing countervailing evidence, in particular as to the nature of litigation.
Many studies have revealed that litigation does not have a uniform nature.9 Many factors determine its positive and negative qualities, including the number of judges, the scope of discovery, and the availability of
effective sanctions for abuse of process.'l We also know that changes in
substantive law affect the quality of litigation by creating, expanding or
contracting rights." Legal changes that can affect litigation include

creating new causes of action, making proofs more or less complicated
for existing rights, and altering remedies, for example, by providing attorneys fees or increasing or limiting recoveries.12 These affect the attractiveness of litigation as a way to solve a problem and thus the num-

ber of litigants who will find it worthwhile to sue. 3 Finally, qualities
that one side may deem as negative the other may see as positive, so
evaluating the positive and negative qualities of litigation depends on

the point of view one takes.
Given mediation's increasingly institutionalized role as a part of
the justice system and impact on litigants and litigation, we need to examine it more closely.' 4 To the extent that mediation is a close relative

9. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 2666.
10. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 3, at 853, 863-65.
11. It is clear that thinking of litigation or ADR as discrete entities ignores important realities
about law. In a sense, legislation is a form of ADR because it is a method of resolving disputes that
is an alternative to litigation. It resolves them on a wider basis than on an individual case. See
Goldberg, supra note 7, at 679. If this is true of legislation, then what of the common law? Both
create and can eliminate causes of action.
12. See generally Rowe, supranote 3, at 851-52, 858-59.
13. See generally id. at 832.
14. Increased scrutiny of ADR is revealing unanticipated flaws. See wissler, supra note 3, at
352-53 (opining that adjudication is perceived as fairer and as allowing greater participation).
Sally Engle Merry criticizes using "user-satisfaction" surveys to evaluate the success of ADR, because a focus on the user's subjective experience reveals nothing about important justice issues,
such as whether rights were protected or power redistributed. See Engle Merry, supra note 8, at
2059 n.13. The recent explosion of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in non-union employment
relationships shows that ADR can be an instrument of injustice. See, e.g., Michael R. Holden,
Note, Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An Argument for Containing FederalArbitration Law, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1695 (1995); Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment
Arbitrationin the United States: Law, PublicPolicy and Data, 23 N.Z. J. INDus. REL. 5 (1998).
In recognition of these problems, on May 21, 1997, the National Academy of Arbitrators
issued guidelines opposing mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment. On July 10, 1997,
the EEOC stated that civil rights laws play a unique role and involve core constitutional principles.
See EEOC Policy Statement on MandatoryArbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 915.002, at D30 (July 11, 1997). Furthermore, Congress has entrusted their interpretation, administration, and
enforcement to the federal government, including agencies and courts which are responsible for
their development and interpretation. See id. Civil rights are public rights, and the public needs to
know the outcome of cases. See id. Moreover, civil rights issues need Supreme Court review so
errors can be corrected and outcomes can be uniform. See id. This public process gives guidance as
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of litigation it is likely to be genetically subject to similar strengths and
weaknesses.15 Although mediation attempts to focus on the parties' relationship rather than legalism, it cannot fully do this.' 6 We already know
that mediation, as is the case with litigation, does not exist outside law
and society.17 Law informs people whether or not a justiciable dispute
exists and thus whether that dispute may be resolved with the aid of
public agencies. 8 Law provides the yardstick that informs disputants,
including those in mediation, whether they have achieved fair outcomes
compared to litigation. 9
Clearly mediation and litigation are both creatures of the law. If
mediation and litigation are both affected by the same factors and in the
same ways, then we may be making serious mistakes. We are training
the next generation of law students, making major policy decisions, and
deciding court cases based on an unexamined, romanticized, and potentially inaccurate view of mediation and may be committed to a course
that will not be easily reversible. In the employment area we can already
see that employees are being deprived of judicial fora for statutory
grievances and due process protections in favor of alternative dispute
resolution. The further institutionalized entrenchment of mediation may
work an injustice in the case of the least powerful in our society.
This article focuses on the extent to which substantive law affects
mediation. Our experience with dispute mediation in the United States is
insufficiently long to provide a case study in which a mediation procedure remained the same while the substantive law was changed. One
powerful and instructive instance of such a situation can, however, be
found in New Zealand labor law.' The mediation procedures under the
to employer, employee, and union rights and duties and also informs the public of the costs of discrimination. See id, Private processes do not allow for development in the law. Mandatory arbitration has a built-in bias for the employer who is a repeat player and thus has better information it
can use in choosing an arbitrator. See id. An employer is also likely to be seen as a source of future
business by the arbitrator, but the employee is not. See id. Furthermore, mandatory arbitration is
imposed by an employer as an aspect of "its superior bargaining power." Id. The average person

will not realize how much is at stake in signing a waiver of the right to trial as a condition of employment. Id
15. See Engle Merry, supra note 8, at 2070.

16. See id at 2068-69.
17. See, e.g., id. at 2064-65.
18. See id at 2061-64; see also Ellen J. Dannin, Consummating Market-Based LaborLaw
Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfiguration, 14 B.U. INT'L L.. 267, 268 (1996)
(exploring the impact of social mores on parties' understanding of their legal rights).
19. See generally Rowe, supranote 3, at 901-02.
20. A description of the enactment of the ECA and its impact can be found in ELLEN I,
DANNY, WORKING FREE: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACt OF NEw ZEALAND's EMPLOYMENT

CoNTRAcrs Acr (1997) [hereinafter DANNIN, WORKiNG FREE]. For an assessment of the ECA
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Labour Relations Act 1987 and its replacement legislation, the Employment Contracts Act 1991, are virtually unchanged," though the
substantive laws and their underlying purposes differ radically. The issue, then is, whether although the mediation procedures have remained
the same, the experience of mediation has altered.
New Zealand provides a robust model for consideration. Not only
does the change in substantive law while maintaining institutionalized
mediation provide a rare opportunity for study, New Zealand is sufficiently similar to the United States to make the comparison meaningful.
Both are developed, industrialized countries, and both also have a strong
mix of industrial, service, and agricultural sectors. Both are heirs to the
common law and thus apply similar bodies of law and concepts. Both
share common histories and cultures as former British colonies with indigenous peoples, and immigration has led to more mixed cultures and
populations in both. Since the early nineteenth century, there has been
persistent interchange between the two countries. Finally, both are democracies with educated, literate populations. 22 In sum, on the key factors that are important in affecting the way people are likely to work and
interact with one another and with the law, New Zealand and the United
States are quite similar.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO NEW ZEALAND LABOR LAW AND MEDIATION
A. The Substantive Law
In 1894, New Zealand became the first country to legalize collective bargaining.2' The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894
("IC&A Act") and its progeny institutionalized processes which today
from multiple points of view and disciplines, see Symposium on New Zealand's Employment ContractsAct, 28 CAL. W. INT'LL.J. 1 (1997).
21. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, General Secretary of the North Island Clothing and
Laundry Workers Union, in Wellington, N.Z. (Aug. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Interview with Joyce
Hawe]. Hawe stated that the key differences are that grievance resolution under the Labour Relations Act was more informal and nonadversarial. See id.
22. See JOHN DEEKS ET AL., LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND ch. 3
(2d ed. 1994); A.J. GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND THE NEW
ZEALAND SYsTEM (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS]. See generally THE
POLMCAL ECONOMY OF NEW ZEALAND (Chris Rudd & Brian Roper eds., 1997). I also make these
statements as one who has lived for extended periods of time in both countries.

23. See Ellen Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment ContractsAct: The
Problem of Coercion, 17 CooP. LAB. L.. 455 (1996) [hereinafter Dannin, BargainingUnder New
Zealand's Employment ContractsAct].
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are referred to as alternative dispute resolution. 4 Wages and other terms
of employment were set through a process of government conciliation
and interest arbitration. In 1971, the law was revised to provide for the
mediation and arbitration of workplace disputes and, in particular, of
personal grievances.5 In 1973 the law added progressive steps to resolve
a claim of unjustifiable dismissal.2 In later years, the basic law was expanded through a series of amendments. 27' The last of these was the Labour Relations Act ("LRA"), enacted in 1987. 2' As a result, for nearly
one hundred years, what we now call ADR has played a key role in New
Zealand labor relations, and mediation has been used to resolve workplace disputes for nearly three decades. 29
The IC&A Act's last iteration, the Labour Relations Act 1987, was
not identical to the U.S. National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") but
has basic features which are quite similar." Both promote the organization of employees so they can bargain effectively with employers; both
encourage the process of collective bargaining as the way to set terms of
employment; and both foster an ongoing relationship among employer,
employee, and union. Among the LRA's express purposes were
"facilitat[ing] the formation of effective and accountable unions and...
employer[] organisations;" providing for the "orderly conduct of
[workplace] relations;" and "provid[ing] a framework to enable agreements to be reached.'
New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act 1991 ("ECA") was a
radical change in the substantive law of the workplace.32 The ECA governs employment relations through a contractual regime and has as its
chief express purpose: to "promote an efficient labour market. '33 The
ECA assumes that equality of power between employers and employees

24. See Lorraine J. Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way: Alternative Dispute Resolution,
EMPL. L. BuLL. 23 (Mar. 1997) [hereinafter Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way].
25. See GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 385.
26. See id. at 386.
27. See id. at 384-86; MIKE DAWSON, HANDLING PERSONAL GRIEVANCES UNDER THE
LABoUR RELATONS Acr 1987: A GUIDE FOR UNION ADVOCATES 11 (1988) [hereinafter DAWSON,
LABOUR RELATIONS Acr].
28. See DAWSON, LABOuR RELATIONS ACr, supra note 27, at 11.
29. See DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 26-38.
30. For a description of the LRA, see Ellen J. Dannin, Labor Law Reform in New Zealand,
13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 40-45 (1992).
31. Labour Relations Act of 1987, preamble, (a)-(c).
32. The changes brought about under the ECA have been referred to as a radical and fundamental transformation of its industrial relations system. See Christopher L. Erickson & Sarosh Kuruvilla, IndustrialRelations System Transformation,52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 14-16 (1998).
33. Employment Contracts Act of 1991, preamble.
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is irrelevant to their ability to strike a bargain and contract for the sale of
a worker's labor powerM Since the enactment of the ECA in 1991, union representation has declined dramatically-from 41.5% when it was
enacted in May 1991 to 19.9% in December 1996."5 In that same period,
union membership dropped from 603,118 to 338,967. 36
B. The Proceduresfor Dispute Resolution
It is astonishing that, despite their radical differences, LRA and
ECA dispute resolution procedures are identical in most respects-at
least on paper. The main changes are in wording: "employee" is substituted for "worker;" references to unions are eliminated;37 and the
"Employment Tribunal" replaced the "Mediation Service." With such
minor changes one might expect personal grievances to be little altered.
However, within a short time, it became clear that ECA mediation had
engendered greater formality, a more adversarial attitude, more protracted disputes, crowded dockets, a devaluation of negotiation as a
method for solving workplace problems, and a lower likelihood that a
rift between employee and employer would be resolved amicably.
1. Personal Grievances Under the Labour Relations Act
The LRA defined personal grievances as including unjustifiable
dismissals, "other unjustifiable detrimental actions such as sexual harassment, duress, and discrimination," or unjustifiable action by the employer which has affected the worker's employment to the worker's disadvantage." Access to the personal grievance procedure was limited to
34. See Raymond Harbridge & Aaron Crawford, The Impact of New Zealand's Employment
ContractsAct on IndustrialRelations, 28 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 235, 250 (1997).

35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Compare the LRA's Seventh Schedule (Clauses to be Inserted in Awards and Agreements in Relation to Settlement of Personal Grievances) with the ECA's First Schedule (Standard
Clauses in Relation to Procedure for Settlement of Personal Grievances). This paper considers only
personal grievances and not other employment disputes, such as disputes of interest, disputes of
rights or breaches of contract. Both the LRA and ECA distinguish personal grievances from disputes. A dispute of rights is a disagreement about the "interpretation, application, or operation of
an employment contract." ECA § 2; see LRA § 2. For a description of the system, see DEEKS, supra note 22, at 94-96.
38. In addition to the narrative description below, see the APPENDIX for a table comparing
the two systems.
39. LRA §§ 209(a), 210-214. For a general description of the process, see GARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 436; A.J. GEARE, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN NEW ZEALAND 360-73 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter GEARE, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
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those union members whose work was covered by an award or agreement. 40 Managers and others outside the award structure took employment-related disputes to the common law courts." As a result, two sepa-

rate systems of labor or employment law developed - one for union
members and one for all other employees. High union membership and
coverage meant that nearly half of workers had access to the personal
grievance procedure.42 In addition, to its express legal protections, the
LRA's standard procedures for personal grievances could be enhanced
by collective agreement.43
Under the statutory process, a personal grievance typically commenced when an employee was discharged. Either the employee or union could request a written statement of reasons for dismissal, and the
employer had to provide the statement within fourteen days." A worker
invoked the personal grievance process by submitting it to the employer
"as soon as practicable after the grievance has arisen so as to enable the
employer to remedy the grievance rapidly and as near as possible to the
point of origin."45 If the grievance could not be resolved, the worker

LATIONS INNEW ZEALAND]. These changes were the result of a long campaign by the New Zealand Business Roundtable and the New Zealand Employers Federation. See Ellen J. Dannin, Hail
Market, Full of Grace: New Zealand Employer Organizations Lobby for Labor Law Reform 2
(Nov. 20, 1998) (paper presented to the Social Sciences History Association) (on file with author)
[hereinafter, Dannin, Hail Market, Full of Grace]. The New Zealand Business Roundtable is an
organization of elite businesspeople which has, since the 1980s, advocated for the liberalization of
the New Zealand economy. See DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 26-33. The New Zealand Employers Federation is an umbrella organization of constituent employer organizations
which provide many services to employers, including representation. See id.
40. See LRA §§ 209(d), 216.
41. See Andrew Caddie & Richard Harrison, New Information: Employment ContractsAct,
N.Z. FOREsTRY 47 (Feb. 1994). The primary LRA remedy was reinstatement. See LRA §§ 209(0,
228. Those who were not covered by the LRA personal grievance procedures could pursue court
actions under the Addis rule, which restricted the remedy to actual loss, and "alternative actions
under the Contractual Mistakes Act and the Fair Trading Act." Memorandum from Paul Bell to
Honorable W.F. Birch, Minister of Labour 3 (Nov. 16, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Paul Bell]. However, three New Zealand cases in the period 1988 to 1990 expanded the remedies available to include compensation for mental distress, anxiety, humiliation,
loss of dignity, and injury to feelings. See GEARE, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NEW
ZEALAND, supranote 39, at 228.
42. Union membership from December 1985 to May 1991 was well above 40%. See Harbridge & Crawford, supra note 34, at 250.
43. See LRA §§ 214-215.
44. See LRA § 225. Additional sources of information were the UB5, employer response to
an application for unemployment benefits. See DAWSON, LABOUR RELATIONS ACr, supra note 27,
at 40; see also LRA Seventh Schedule No. 16(1)(b) (outlining a union's rights if an employer fails
to provide the required statement).
45. LRA Seventh Schedule No. 2.
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could ask the union to pursue it,46 and the union could then "take the
matter up with the employer" - first verbally and then, if necessary, by
submitting a written statement setting out the "nature of the grievance,"
the "facts giving rise to [it]," and "[tihe remedy sought." 47 The employer
then had fourteen days to respond.
At this point, the government provided mediation assistance
through a grievance committee composed of equal numbers of union
and employer representatives." Mediators were employed by the Mediation Service, and their role was to "assist employers and their representatives and workers and their representatives to achieve and maintain
effective labour relations" and to "assist [the parties] to solve the dispute.""° The members of the committee were "not junior and senior
council [sic] who put a case" to a court.' The committee was intended
to involve all parties in the decision-making process. 2
The grievance committee could hear witnesses and examine documentary evidence.53 The chairperson could question witnesses for clarification and give guidance to the parties.M Once the presentations were
made, parties could examine each other's presentations jointly or separately." If they separated, the chairperson could float between rooms to
encourage settlement or bring them back together. 6 The grievance
committee voted as to how to resolve the matter." If an employer refused to cooperate, the union could set up the grievance committee with
only union members to make the decision (leaving the employer with no
appeal except with leave of the Labour Court) or seek to have the grievance heard directly in the Labour Court." LRA mediation was essentially med-arb, because if the parties could not resolve the grievance, the
mediator as committee chair made the decision. The mediator's deci-

46. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. 3.
47. LRA Seventh Schedule Nos. 4-5.
48. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. 6.
49. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. 7.

50. LRA § 253(1), (2)(c).
51. Mediation Service, Summary of Submission on Options Paper: The Employment Contracts Bill 2-3 (Apr. 1991) (on file with author).
52. See id. at 2.
53. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. 8.
54. See LRA § 253.
55. See DAWsON, LABOUR RELATIONS Acr, supra note 27, at 50.
56. See id.; see also LRA Seventh Schedule No. 11(1)(A).
57. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. Il(1)(A).
58. See LRA § 218(1)(a), Seventh Schedule No. 16.
59. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. 1l(1)(A).
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sion could be appealed de novo to the Labour Court.60
Practicing lawyers had little presence in grievance committees.
Normally a union representative brought the case, and an Employer's
Association advocate represented employers in 50% of cases. 6' Half of
employers represented themselves or hired a lawyer.62
2. Personal Grievances Under the ECA
The philosophy of the ECA would appear to have no place for a
statutory personal grievance procedure. The drafters wanted to
"normalize" labor law as much as possible, which to them meant treating it as contract law and using the common law courts. Indeed, ECA
proponents contended that a contractual system would end workplace
conflict.63
A personal grievance procedure was included with other last minute changes in late April 1991.64 This occurred behind closed doors, so
it's not clear why something so antithetical to the views of ECA proponents happened.65 Some claimed "a personal grievance procedure was
included in legislation for the purpose of limiting damaging strike action
where it appeared a dismissal had been unreasonable."' Others said it
was done so as not to encourage employees to seek collective agreements or join unions.67 Given the timing and events, a more credible reason appears to be that it was done to placate massive opposition to the
ECA which saw nearly one-sixth of the New Zealand population inm This left only a few days to draft these and
volved in public protest.6
other provisions, since the ECA was supposed to be in effect on May 1,
1991.69 With no time to draft a new procedure, the old procedure was in-

60. See LRA Seventh Schedule No. 16-18.
61. See W.R.C. GARDINER, The Employment Tribunal: A Report from the Trenches 6.

62. See id.
63. See Dannin, Hail Market, Full of Grace, supranote 39, at 4.
64. See 43 Par]. Deb. (2d ed. Sess.) 1431 (1991) (N.Z.)
65. NZBR Executive Director Roger Kerr referred to its inclusion and extension of coverage
as unfortunate. See Roger Kerr, Bargaining Under the Employment ContractsAct, EMPL. L. BULL.
97 (Sept. 1995).
66. Barbara Burton, Random New Year Jottings,EMPL. L. BULL. 7 (Jan. 1997).
67. See Memorandum from Bell, supra note 41, at 3.
68. See DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 152-54. Burton's explanation, supra note
66, appears to be a long after-the-fact justification. If it or Bell's arguments had held weight, a personal grievance procedure would have been included in the draft bill, but none was.
69. See DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 152-54. See generally 43 PARL. DEB. (2d
Sess.) 1430 (1991) (N.Z.).
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m in essence only those changes
corporated with only minor tinkering,"
necessary to make it consistent with the ECA, chiefly the elimination of

any references to unions.
The ECA defines a personal grievance as a claim an employee has
"against the employee's employer or former employer" that the employee has been unjustifiably dismissed; that the employee's employment or conditions of employment have been "affected to the employee's disadvantage by an unjustifiable action by the employer;" that
the employee has been discriminated against; that the employee has
been sexually harassed; or that the employee has been subject to duress
in relation to membership or nonmembership in an employees' organization." The ECA extended personal grievance coverage to all employees, not just union members, thus displacing the common law system
with the ECA's statutory process. As a result 1.6 million were eligible to
file grievances compared to 625,000 under the LRA.72 Assuming workplace disputes continued at the same level as under the ECA, one would
expect personal grievance filings to more than double based solely on
this increased coverage.
Contrary to the hopes of ECA proponents, workplace disputes can
and do exist under a contractual regime. In 1997, 25% of workplaces
surveyed reported having had a dispute or grievance during the prior
year. The most common concerned performance (33%), discipline

(28%), redundancy (i.e. layoff for lack of work) (12%), and contractual

70. Minister of Labour Bill Birch noted: "It largely maintains existing definitions and procedures, keeping the resolution of grievances close to the work-place." 43 PARL. DEB., H.R. (1st
Sess.) 480 (1990) (N.Z.).
71. See ECA § 27. Sexual harassment claims could use either the personal grievance procedure of the ECA or the complaints procedure of the Human Rights Act but not both. See Julie
Kemp, Walking the Fine Line of the Human Rights Act Successfully in the Workplace 6 (Mar. 34, 1997) (paper prepared for the 11th Annual Industrial Relations Conference) (on file with
author).
72. See Raymond Harbridge, Recent Industrial Disputes and the Impact on Future Industrial
Relations Management 9 (March 3-4, 1997) (paper prepared for the 11th Annual Industrial Relations Conference) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harbridge, Recent Industrial Disputes]. Roger
Kerr, Executive Director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, one of the major advocates of
the ECA, complained about this extension of access to personal grievances: "The ECA was a massive step backward in this regard, and Employment Court rulings have made the problem worse.
The extension of the law to employees in the executive category, for example, is probably the
greatest protection system for incompetent managers ever devised." Roger Kerr, Obstacles to Employment and Productivity Growth in New Zealand's Labour Market 7 (Mar. 3, 1997) (paper prepared for the 11 th Annual Industrial Relations Conference) (on file with author).
73. See Department of Labour, Contract: The Report on Current Industrial Relations in New
Zealand 10 (Nov. 1997).
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disagreements (9%).74 Not all these workplace problems necessarily re-

sult in filing for mediation with the Employment Tribunal, either because they are resolved or the employee decided not to file. 5

The ability to resolve many grievances and disputes in the workplace does not mean that the Employment Tribunal has been left with
nothing to do. Rather, as TABLE I demonstrates, dramatically increased
filings have resulted in a growing backlog.
TABLE 176
YEAR TO

JUNE

OUTSTANDING APPLICATIONS APPLICATIONS APPLICATIONS OUTSTANDING

APPLICATIONS

RECEIVED

WrTHDRAWN

DISPOSED

AT START

APPLICATIONS
AT END

1992*

17

2,332

459

743

1,079

1993

1,079

3,207

743

1,568

1,919

1994

1,919

3,592

1,046

2,447

1,954

1995

1,954

4,284

976

3,040

2,184

1996

2,184

5,144

1,121

3,218

2,985

* First year of operation. The ECA was effective May 15, 1991.

The ECA requires that every contract have a personal grievance
procedure which defines the substantive violations as set out in the ECA

"unless the employment contract gives an extended meaning to the
term."' Failing to provide for a personal grievance procedure means
74. See id.
75. A recent survey found that sixty-nine percent of workplace disputes go no farther than
either internal discussion, dismissal, or discipline. See id. Seventeen percent of those not resolved
are taken to the Employment Tribunal, and sixteen percent go to independent mediation. See id.;
see also Colmar Brunton Research, Executive Summary: Survey of Labour Market Adjustment

Under the Employment Contracts Act 8 (Aug. 1997).
76. Harbridge & Crawford, supra note 34, at 251.
77. ECA § 31. Some contracts include the procedure provided for in the First Schedule. See,
e.g., Wellington City Transport Limited, Collective Employment Contract 49-50 (1996-1999). In
the alternative, some contracts incorporate those terms by reference. See, e.g., South Fish Group,
Collective Employment Contract 16 (May 1, 1994 through Apr. 20, 1996); Individual Employment
Contract Between McCain Foods (N.Z.) Limited and Employee 15 (1996-1997); Mainland Products, Collective Employment Contract 26 (Aug. 23, 1996 through Aug. 22, 1997); Sealord Products Ltd, Dunedin, Collective Employment Contract 22 (Aug. 10, 1996 through Aug. 9, 1997);
Cadbury Confectionery Ltd.: Confectioners, Stores, Cleaners & Cafeteria Staff, Collective Contract of Employment 31 (June 16, 1996 through July 15, 1997). Rarely, the parties might vary
them, for example, by providing an additional internal dispute resolution process designed to settle
grievances early and informally. See J. Wattie Foods Ltd., Collective Employment Contract 44-46
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that the ECA's first schedule becomes part of the contract.7 In keeping
with its free market philosophy, parties are not required to use the Tribunal, 9 and use of the Tribunal and Court is not free.80
Some ECA supporters believed that most would opt out of the
statutory procedures because they would be too slow,8" and private procedures offered greater confidentiality. Overall, about ten percent of all
contracts now provide for dispute resolution other than the mediation
and arbitration provided by the government. 3 Indeed, a strong impetus

towards an alternative is avoiding delay.N
The ability to opt out of the statutory procedure doesn't go far
enough for some, such as the New Zealand Employers Federation

(Aug. 2, 1996 through Aug. 1, 1997).
78. See ECA § 32(2)(b).
79. See ECA §§ 78(4), (5). Some New Zealand employers advocate using alternatives, such
as mediation and arbitration, as a way of avoiding the expense and uncertainty of the Tribunal
processes. See Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way, supra note 24, at 23; Caddie & Harrison,
supra note 41, at 47. Apparently, most have not actually done so at this point. See Peter Churchman, Avoiding the Rigour of the PersonalGrievance Provisionsof the Employment ContractsAct,
22 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 171, 177-81 (1997). The New Zealand Employers Federation and New Zealand Business Roundtable have long campaigned to privatize all mediation and arbitration functions. See N.Z. Employers Fed'n, Employment Contracts Bill 1991: Submission B24-25 (Jan. 30,
1991); N.Z. Bus. Roundtable, New Zealand LabourMarket Reform: A Submission in Response to
the Green Paper 10 (Apr. 1986). It wanted to semi-privatize mediation functions so that.mediators
would become employees and would be engaged by the choice of the parties. See N.Z. Employers
Fed'n, Employment Contracts Bill 1991: Submission C18 (Jan. 30, 1991). At the same time, it
supported state funding for mediation and arbitration: "it is in the national interest that the parties
to industrial relationships have free access to resolution procedures." N.Z. Employers Fed'n, Employment Contracts Bill 1991: Submission B25 (Jan. 30, 1991). During the ECA's drafting, it was
recommended that the ability to contract out of the procedure and use private mediation and arbitration be made clear. See Memorandum from Paul Bell, supranote 41, at 3.
80. In its earliest years, the filing fee for personal grievances was $NZ35, and adjudication
fees were $NZ75 per half day in the Tribunal and $NZ150 for a half day in the Court See John
Hughes, The "Freedom" to Enforce Contracts,INDUS. L. BuLL. 6 (Aug. 1992). With the cost of an
attorney, one day at the Employment Tribunal costs about $NZ1300; an additional two days to
prepare the case adds $NZ3900. The average cost of a Tribunal case is $NZ1500 to $NZ5000. See
Lorraine Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal and Employment Court Three Years on..., EMPL.
L. BuLL. 55, 55-56 (June 1994) [hereinafter Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal].
81. See 43 PARL. DEB. (2d Sess.) 1458 (1991) (N.Z.).
82. See Big Bucks Beckon BargainingAgents, PSA J. 2 (July 1991). Privatizing employment
disputes has also brought abuses and a need for regulation. See id.
83. See RAYMOND HARBRIDGE, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: BARGAINING TRENDS &
EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1996197, at 48 (1997). Nine percent of contracts have alternative personal grievance provisions, fifty-four percent in the government trading sector, seventy-eight percent in agriculture, and seventy-one percent in communications. See RAYMOND HARBRIDGE, Er
AL., EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: BARGAINING TRENDS & EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1995/96, at
12(1996).
84. See RAYMOND HARBRiDGE, Er AL., EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: BARGANING TRENDS &
EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1995/96, at 12 (1996).
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("NZEF') and New Zealand Business Roundtable ("NZBR"). They oppose requiring any procedure and statutorily mandating the level of
protections and remedies. 5 Part of this opposition is motivated by ideology, but part of it is a reaction to decisions through the Employment
Tribunal and Court that decreased employer power to act unilaterally to
impose working conditions or to terminate workers.86 Employers complain bitterly about several well-publicized victories in personal grievance cases that they see as not allowing employers to make unilateral
and unreviewable personnel decisions." The move from statutory institutions thus appears to be an effort to establish a regime to restore this
power to employers," rather than a desire to achieve what are normally
seen as the benefits of ADR.s9 One popular device for avoiding fairness
85. See N.Z. Employers Fed'n, Submission to the Labour Parliamentary Select Committee
on the Review of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, at 20 (May 26, 1993). The NZBR argues
that mandatory personal grievance procedures and institutional arrangements-that is the Employment Tribunal and Court--constitute a key impediment to employment. Furthermore, it argues, a standard grievance procedure reflects an outdated conflict model of employment relations
which mistakenly assumes employees had less bargaining power. See N.Z. Bus. Roundtable,
Moving into the Fast Lane 32 (Mar. 1996). The NZBR contends that employment at will would
result in a superior system because employers and employees in long term relationships have a
strong incentive to think about how to handle a relationship. See N.Z. Bus. Roundtable, Submission to the Labour Select Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 12 (Feb. 1991). The more
heavily invested in the relationship they are, the scarcer their opportunities and skills, the more
likely they are to agree on a grievance mechanism. See id. In other cases, it is best to break off the
relationship and look elsewhere for contractual partners. See id. Any limitations on an employer's
right to fire only increases the costs of employment and thus reduces employment. See id.
86. New Zealand employers dislike having to engage in a procedurally fair process to discharge a worker, even when that means following procedures they themselves instituted or agreed
to. See, e.g., Gordon Anderson, Reforming ProceduralFairnessRequirements, EMPL. L. BULL.
114, 115 (Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Anderson, Reforming Procedural Fairness Requirements];
Burton, supra note 66, at 7; Rebecca MacFie, Labour Department Officials Push Limits of EC Act,
EMPL. L. BULL. 30 (Mar. 1997). Employers have tried to limit their susceptibility to personal
grievances by including a wide range of creative language in written contracts which waives
claims and which gives employers the unilateral right to impose changed conditions. See, e.g.,
Mark Gosche, The Impact of the Employment Contracts Act 1991: Reviewing the Act-Unions
and Bargaining Agents (May 15, 1992) (paper presented to a public seminar at the Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington) (on file with author).
87. Several large recoveries by executives and managers received prominent news coverage.
See Finlay MacDonald, You're Fired, I'm Hired,LiSTENER 28 (Oct. 8, 1994). However, the average payout for successful claimants is $NZ5000. See id. at 30.
88. See Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way, supra note 24, at 24.
89. Some New Zealand employer groups have long advocated preventing interference with
their ability to manage. The NZBR, for example, urges rejecting giving workers substantive rights.
See Gordon Anderson, The Judiciary,The Court and Appeals, EMPL. L. BULL. 90 (Nov. 1993)
[hereinafter Anderson, The Judiciary];Gordon Anderson, FurtherReforms to Employment Law?,
EMPL. L. BULL. 2 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter Anderson, Further Reforms]. The NZBR argues that
requiring fairness decreases unemployment, because employers then worry they cannot fire an underperforming employee and are thus reluctant to hire new workers. See MacDonald, supra note
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is the fixed-term contract. 90 Employers have argued that fixed-term contracts create no employee rights, no employer liability, and thus no personal grievances. 9' Fixed-term contracts demonstrate that there seems to
be no limit to employers' quest for absolute, unfettered control. The record for the shortest term fixed-term contracts may be one that operates
hour-to-hour.9 A second key way to avoid personal grievances is either
contracting out work or using independent contractors.93 Non-employees
have no rights under the ECA. Many of these are similar to the motives
that have led United States employers to seek predispute arbitration
agreements.
An aggrieved employee may ask for a written statement of the
employer's reasons within sixty days of being dismissed, and the employer must provide it within fourteen days." The employee has ninety
days from the time a grievance arises to submit it to the employer. 6 If
discussions between the employer and employee fail to resolve the
grievance, the employee must then submit a written statement setting
out the nature of the grievance, the facts giving rise to the grievance,
and the remedy sought. 97 The employer may grant the grievance or,
within fourteen days, give the employee a written response setting out
the employer's view of the facts and remedy sought. 9
The matter may next be filed with the Employment Tribunal if it
remains unresolved or, if the employer fails to provide a written statement, within fourteen days after the employee provided a written response.9 The Tribunal is to provide "[a]ppropriate services that will

87, at 28-29.
90. See Churchman, supranote 79, 172-77.
91. See id.; Bernard Banks, More on the Hagg Decision - A Possible Turning Point,EMPL.
L. BULL. 62 (June 1997).
92. See "Model" ContractsThat Don't Hit the Headlines,PSA J. 8-9 (Mar. 1992).
93. See Anderson, Reforming ProceduralFairnessRequirements, supranote 86, at 114.
94. See Churchman, supra note 79, at 181-87.
95. See ECA § 38. An alternate source for information can be the UB5, the employer's
statement why the employee was terminated, provided to the Department of Social Welfare when
the employee applies for unemployment benefits. See MIKE DAWSON, HANDLING PERSONAL
GRIEVANCES UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS Acr 1991: A GUIDE FOR UNION ADVOCATES
40 (1992) [hereinafter DAWSON, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT].
96. See ECA § 33(2), (3), First Schedule Nos. 2-3. Section 3 also provides that the Employment Tribunal has the power to grant an expansion of the time to file. See ECA § 3.
97. See ECA First Schedule No. 4. A personal grievance manual prepared in 1992 for the
Trade Union Education Association advised that the worker's written statement should be brief but
factually correct. See DAWSON, EMPLOYMENT CoNTRACTs ACT, supra note 95, at 18.
98. See ECA First Schedule No. 5. The ECA permits waiving the exchange of written statements. See ECA § 6.
99. See ECA First Schedule No. 7.
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facilitate the mutual resolution by parties to employment contracts of

' ° and to serve as a "low level, indifferences that arise between them'""

formal, specialist [body] to provide speedy, fair, and just resolution of

differences between parties to employment contracts" when "mutual
resolution is either inappropriate or impossible.''. Parties appearing be-

fore the Tribunal may be represented by any representative the party
authorizes, including a barrister or solicitor.'2

The Employment Tribunal mediates or, if unsuccessful, later adjudicates/arbitrates the grievance.0 3 The ECA does not permit the Tribunal
member who mediates to arbitrate/adjudicate the case."° However, the

parties may give the mediator authority to make a final, binding, and
nonappealable decision during the mediation process.

5

C. Impact of Differences in ECA Procedure
Before examining the impact of substantive changes, we need to
consider the extent to which different procedures have affected mediation. Essentially, homologous procedures exist under each statute; and
the few differences grow out of the ECA's elimination of a role for un-

ions. ' For example, having equal numbers of employer and union representatives meet guided by a mediator at the worksite has been re-

100. ECA § 76(b).
101. ECA § 76(c).
102. See ECA § 90.
103. See ECA First Schedule No. 8. Some members only mediate, some only adjudicate, and

some do both. See

GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,

supra note 22, at 482. See generally ECA §§

78, 79, 80. Dividing mediation from adjudication means that a case may be heard twice if it does
not settle before adjudication, thus potentially doubling the Tribunal's caseload.
104. See ECA § 81(5); see also Walter Grills, Dispute Resolution in the Employment Tribunal
- PartOne: Mediation, 17 N.Z. J.IND. REL. 333, 335 (1992).
105. See ECA § 88(2); Grills, supra note 104, at 336; Interview with Alastair Duncan, Organiser, Service Workers Union, in Wellington, N.Z. (July 29, 1997) [hereinafter Interview with
Alastair Duncan]. Alan Geare points out that the statute presumes a greater distinction between
mediation and adjudication than exists in practice. For example, mediators may push parties to
settle by telling them what is a reasonable settlement, and some adjudicators may encourage informal bargaining. Section 88(2) implicitly recognizes this. See GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
supra note 22, at 482-83. Giving the mediator the power to adjudicate can be used as a tactic:
[Viery frequently it was a very useful tactic to walk into the room and even before you
presented your case to say, "We're here to get a settlement and to that end, we give the
mediator the power to make a decision." And frequently, that was a much more effective position, because that then put the employer party on the back foot. If they are not
going to trust the person who was supposedly mediating to also adjudicate or arbitrate,
then it doesn't make them look very good.
Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105.
106. See GEARE, INDuSiALRELATONS, supranote 22, at 469.
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placed by the employer, employee, and their representatives (if any)
meeting at the Employment Tribunal offices. The place and participants
mean that LRA mediation had a strong relationship to collective negotiation and was situated within a negotiated relationship." LRA personal grievances were not strictly personal because they were never far
removed from collectivity and the worksite.0'° A dispute over an interpretation would send the union to the employer to try to change the interpretation."° If there was a serious problem, the union was more likely
to strike than file a personal grievance.1 Unions saw strong union organization as the best way to prevent grievances from arising."' Substituting for this structure with a meeting between the parties and their representatives is only outwardly the same. The two processes exist within
different power contexts and with different resources and options arrayed on each side. A personal grievance under the ECA is exactly that:
personal.
The drastically reduced union presence has meant eliminating their
gatekeeper role in defusing disputes, in achieving early resolutions, in
sorting out whether a worker wanted to pursue a grievance, and in providing a sympathetic ear if the employee simply wanted someone to
listen."' Organiser Alastair Duncan observed: "A lot of the calls that we
received then, as now, really are people bringing up and wanting somebody to say, 'Hey, that's bad. What's happened to you isn't fair.' ...
[They wanted] simply the affirmation that what had been done to them
was wrong."" 3 The greater union presence prevented some problems and
diverted many others away from the more formal grievance process by
achieving an early reconciliation."
Minor changes have caused ECA mediation to have more of an
adjudicative flavor. ECA grievances have a statute of limitations. 5 Access to the ECA personal grievance procedure is a matter of statutory
right,11 6 as opposed to being based on union membership and collective
107. See Interview with Graeme Clark, General Secretary, Manufacturers and Construction
Workers Union, in Wellington, N.Z. (July 28, 1997) [hereinafter Interview with Graeme Clark].

108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Seeid.
111. See NEW ZEALAND AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING AND RELATED TRADES INDUSTRIAL
UNION OF WORKERS, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: REPRESENTING WORKERS IN A NEw ENVIRONMENT 39 (1987).
112. Seeid. at39.
113. Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105.

114. Seeid.
115. See ECA § 26(a); GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 465, 469.
116. See id. If the parties fail to agree to another procedure, ECA Schedule No. 1 is deemed to
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bargaining coverage. Increasing coverage to all employees means more
than simply doubling the numbers of people eligible to file personal
grievances; it means that over half of those with personal grievances
have no experience with union representation."'1 They are thus likely to
bring more personal and less collective attitudes into mediation."' LRA
mediation or med-arb was nonbinding; parties could take de novo appeals to the Labour Court."9 This provided more fluidity and allowed
the parties and the (nonlawyer) mediators to focus their efforts on the
situation and resolving the problem, as opposed to applying the law to
the facts. All were aware that mistakes were not necessarily fatal, that
they could alter their positions and present new evidence after seeing the
other side's case.2 Although these changes appear to be around the
margins, they have helped transform how mediation operates and how
the parties experience it.
This does not mean that LRA mediation was in all ways fairer or a
resounding success or that ECA mediation is in all ways unfair or a failure. The Tribunal has had good statistical success in resolving disputes.1 Eighty-five percent of cases are resolved at the mediation conference." Half of those unresolved settle or are withdrawn after
mediation and before adjudication."z Mediation is also relatively efficient. Ninety-two percent of grievances taken to mediation are resolved
in less than two days, and seventy-five percent take less than one day.'24
The increased filings shown in TABLE I above don't suggest that
grievants have abandoned the Tribunal. There are enough disputes and
enough belief that the Tribunal has something to offer that filings continue to be made and made at ever increasing levels. However, as will
be discussed in the next sections, employers, employees, unions, and
government officials complain that mediation is now too formal, too expensive, too adversarial, and too likely to reach unsatisfactory outcomes. These criticisms will be explored here in the context of how the
substantive law has affected mediation and caused these complaints to
be raised.
be part of the contract. See ECA Schedule No. 1.
117. See id.
118. See Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107.
119. SeeLRA § 217(1)(a).
120. A de novo appeal gave the parties a second chance to get case the right. See Interview
with Graeme Clark, supranote 107.
121. See GARDINER, supranote 61, at 5.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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1. Effects of the Substantive Law: Ascertaining Whether a Personal
Grievance Exists
The ECA's substantive law, founded in its contractual nature,
makes mediation more difficult. At a basic level, it is harder to know
whether a personal grievance even exists because it is now more difficult to ascertain the terms of employment covering the employee and to
gain access to employees.
a. Contract Terms
An employee cannot claim to have been unjustifiably dismissed or
unjustifiably disadvantaged unless the employee's terms of employment
are known. It is now, however, more difficult to collect this information.
Under the LRA, a worker's terms could be determined by examining
one collective document, usually an award, and this one document set
terms for many workers, i.e., all those in a specific job classification
over a wide geographic area and across employers."z Awards were
written and could not be varied except by the union and employers - and
certainly not by individual employeesl 6 Organisers were aware of and
familiar with award terms they administered, their settled interpretation,
and the union's future goals as to their interpretation and enforcement.27
The ECA establishes a complex, anarchistic, even chaotic, system
of wage setting." The ECA promotes individual contracts,'29 and nothing requires them to be in writing.' In fact, most employment contracts

125. See DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 14-15.
126. See LRA §§ 186-208.
127. See generally Interview with Campbell Duignan and Neville Donaldson, Organisers,
United Food and Beverage Workers Union, in Dunedin, N.Z. (July 25, 1997) [hereinafter Interview with Duignan and Donaldson]; Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105; Interview
with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21.
128. There are serious gaps in information available about the form and content of employment contracts. The ECA requires the government to collect only collective employment contracts
and only those from worksites with more than twenty employees. Employer compliance has been
as low as 5% of the contracts from worksites with over twenty employees. See DANNIN, WORKING
FREE, supra note 20, at 174. This eventually forced the Department of Labour to post a disclaimer
as to the validity of the data derived from their sample. See id. Most workplaces in New Zealand
are far smaller than twenty employees; 80% of companies employ five or fewer workers. See
RIcHARD RUDMAN, HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND: CONTEXTS AND
PROCESSES 45-46 (1991); see, e.g., GEARE, INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 22, at 499; Richard Whatman et al., Labour MarketAdjustment Under the Employment ContractsAct, 19 N.Z. J.
IND. REL. 53, 54 n.2 (1994).
129. See DANNN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 231-34.
130. See Interview with Lucy Highfield, Attorney, Service Workers Union, in Wellington,
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in New Zealand appear to be oral.'' A survey found that only 18.7% of
long-term employees had a written contract, and, of professionals, only
27.3% did. 32 Employees with oral contracts may believe they don't have
a contract and thus any rights, because they don't realize custom and
practice can create enforceable contract terms.'
Unions are not involved in the formation of most contracts and are
34
generally not even a party to employment contracts they negotiate;
rather, they are employee agents, and that agency can be revoked or
created at any time. 3 5 A union may even represent a worker but have
had nothing to do with creating the worker's employment terms. 36 Contracts can be collective or individual. 1' Individual contracts are not necessarily individualized contracts, but each may'have one or two unique
terms. 138 More than one contract can apply to an employee, and employers have actively sought this sort of arrangement by using a base collective contract with general terms applicable companywide (essentially
the terms that in the United States would go in an employee handbook),
in connection with a more detailed collective contract and an individual
contract with wage and other individual terms.'39
Written contracts do not necessarily eliminate problems with ascertaining terms. Before it can be determined that a personal grievance exists, all relevant contracts must be located."4 This is not easy when so
many contracts come into existence without stable employee representation. "' A potential grievant may be covered by an unknown number of
agreements, not all may be in writing, and they may be varied by the
employee's agreement with the employer or by simple acquiescence in
the employer's actions. 4 2 Some contracts allow the employer unilaterN.Z. (June 10, 1996) [hereinafter Interview with Lucy Highfield].
131. See id.
132. See Erling Rasmussen, Workplace Transformation Under the Employment ContractsAct
1991, 454, 456 (Ray Fells & Trish Todd eds., Feb. 1996) (Current Research in Industrial Relations: Proceedings of the 10th AIRAANZ Conference).
133. See Interview with Lucy Highfield, supra note 130.
134. See DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 217-20.
135. See Ellen Dannin, Solidarity Forever? Unions and Bargaining Representation Under

New Zealand's Employment ContractsAct, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1,23-33 (1995).
136. Cf. ECA § 19(2).
137. See ECA Preamble.
138. See Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment ContractsAct, supra note
23, at 455-56.
139. See Interview with Francis Wevers, Management Consultant, The Umbrella Group, in
Wellington, N.Z. (May 20, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with Francis Wevers].
140. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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ally to vary the rules from time to time, so one party can effectively
amend the document and the other will not know this has happened."
Many employment contracts are now written by inexperienced people,
and because of this, they are badly drafted and difficult to understand.'"
Especially in small workplaces, written contracts are often no more than
one to two pages long and cover only basic terms, often no more than
working hours. 4 ' The ECA has also led to a series of union amalgamations as a result of the steep loss of members.'" This means that organisers are less familiar with the broader range of a particular group of employees' needs, their contract terms, and their history. 47
Service Workers Union Organiser, Alastair Duncan, describes how
these problems affect his job:
Well, the first real needle in that particular haystack is going to be
is there in fact a contract to check. The Service Workers Union, although it has a number of national contracts, a small number of multiemployer contracts, and then site contracts, probably half the calls that
we would receive or any organiser would receive are for workers who
either don't have a contract or, if the contract exists, they've never
seen it.
So accessing the actual documentation, if such documentation exists, can be the first hurdle. Probably of those, half who are unaware or
at least are not covered by a contract that we hold a copy of, they'll
have something in writing. It'll usually be pretty shonky [bad]. But
then that will leave a good number who simply have nothing. Who
have in fact a verbal contract that may have done no more than identi-

143. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127; Interview with Alastair
Duncan, supranote 105; Interview with Lucy Highfield, supra note 130. Graeme Clarke, however,
contends that this may not be a large problem in personal grievances.
mhe contract gets made by performance. If you agree to do something, it becomes part
of your contract. So it's often difficult to say what someone's contract is in such circumstances. But really the contract would have very little bearing on a personal grievance situation. The only time when the contract would really come into play would be
perhaps in work performance. The boss asked you to do Job X, and you say, no, that's
not part of my contract and that implies quite a confident level of awareness that isn't
present in a non-union site. I mean, the boss asks you to do a job, you do it.
Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107.
144. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105.
145. See Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107; Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supranote 127; Interview with Lucy -ighfield, supra note 130.
146. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
147. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105.
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fled salary and, perhaps, hours. Perhaps not even that. 4 '
Since the ECA allows parties to agree to an alternative procedure'49
a grievant must determine if such an alternative has been agreed to in
order to avoid fruitlessly pursuing a grievance in the wrong forum using
the wrong procedure. 5 In addition, it must be determined whether the
agreed-upon procedure is inconsistent with the ECA's minimum requirements, because section 32 states that parties cannot limit remedies.'
All this ambiguity and uncertainty creates fertile ground for disagreement and misunderstanding as to basic rights and duties and makes
all disputes more complex. Even though no definitive ruling need be
made on intent or the agreement's terms in mediation, the parties are
likely to act in mediation based on their understandings of those terms.
Agreement as to the meaning of ambiguous or missing terms is less
likely when a dispute is brought into mediation. The task of ascertaining
the parties' intent (assuming there was one on the points in dispute) will
be clouded by emotion and an awareness that any particular interpretation will lead to a specific outcome. Parties are thus likely to be less
willing and even to lack incentive to agree as to the document's intent
and terms. In such a context, mediation must overcome many hurdles to
achieve party concurrence on a resolution. Finally, all this complexity
and uncertainty is likely to create an insuperable hurdle for those employees in the least advantaged situations.
b. Access to Grievants
The ECA's time limits for filing personal grievances makes it necessary to learn about a grievance, ascertain the worker's rights, and decide whether to pursue them more quickly. The ECA, however, makes
all this more difficult by giving unions less access to employees. The
LRA provided union representatives with a statutory right of access to
the workplace. 5 2 Under the ECA access is limited,'53 so a union or other
representative may have trouble learning that a grievance exists at all or
in time to file. In the worst cases, an employee may be fearful or igno148. ld
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Nicola Crutchley & Virginia Hardy, Running an Employment Law Case 15 (Apr.May 1996) (N.Z. L. Soc'y Seminar).
152. See LRA § 56(1).
153. See ECA §§ 13-15; see also Interview with Joyce Hawe, supranote 21.
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rant and may wait too long before taking action.'" Learning that a grievance exists and bringing a timely grievance depends on the sophistication of an employee or the degree to which a union has organized a
workplace and been able to maintain organization, solidarity, and discipline.'
The decline of a union presence in New Zealand society 15 6 and in a
specific workplace coupled with employers' greater willingness to exclude unions and take extreme actions means employees are less likely
to have the courage to challenge an employer action, including taking up
grievances. They may also lack easy access to information to decide
whether they have a viable grievance. The lack of a union presence
means less support to employees considering whether to challenge an
employer action. While the figures of increased Employment Tribunal
filings might suggest that there is no problem with workers' finding
their way to mediation when problems arise, they could also reflect a
very high level of employer wrongful actions with only a small percentage resulting in formal filings. With what is known about the ECA's
impact on wages and other working conditions, this latter conclusion
seems likely. Unfortunately, we currently lack data as to how these
changes are affecting filings.
2. Factors that Increase Adversarialness
Factors that are making ECA mediation more adversarial include
the entry of representatives with little or no background in industrial relations or mediation; changing work from a relationship to a contract or
market exchange; new methods of paying representatives; and changes
in Tribunal adjudication.
a. The Entry of New Representatives
When the LRA was enacted in 1987, lawyers were for the first time
permitted to represent parties before industrial courts and tribunals." 7
Law firms had no experience in labor law, and no group of labor representatives outside unions and the Employer Associations existed. This
154. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
155. See id.
156. See supranotes 35-36 and accompanying text.
157. See Keith Peterson, In Defence of the Employment Court, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 4,
1997, at 21. Lawyers did represent employees who were not union members before the High Court
in contractual disputes concerning employment. See DEEKS, supra note 22, at 382-84.
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situation continued with little change during the LRA years. Under the
ECA, anyone who has not been convicted of a serious felony in the last
ten years can be a representative. 8 ECA proponents advocated the entry
of new employee representatives to compete with unions in order to
create competition that would, they said, lead to superior services for
workers.'59 The New Zealand Employers Federation contended the

availability of superior alternative representation had caused the rapid
decline in union membership

6°

In fact many employees, both individually and collectively, are now
choosing to be represented by a range of non-union people or organisations. This includes lawyers, accountants, private consultants, a parent, a friend or a workmate.
The essential feature, however is that to gain the right to represent
and to keep it, the representative is being required to understand the
needs and aspirations of the individual or group being represented, to
understand the needs and aspirations of the employer concerned and to
become a constructive part of that enterprise focused partnership.
That is pretty new and radical stuff for most traditional6 unions and
as those figures show, they have lost out in the transition. 1
There is reason to doubt this rosy picture. Certainly, managers and
others now able to invoke mediation could afford lawyers and other representatives. 62 Lawyers also might be available to the impoverished
through legal aid, but no funds were provided for other sorts of representatives. 63

158. SeeECA§ 11.
159. See DANNN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 45-48.
160. See id.
161. The "New" Unions,THE EMPLOYER, 145 (Dec. 1995).
162. See John Haigh, The Role and Future of the Labour Court - Does it Have One? 7 (May
1991) (on file with author).
163. See id. During the ECA's drafting, it was noted that access for individuals who cannot
afford the procedural costs must be addressed "if the equity side of the framework is not to be
overlooked." Memorandum from R. A. Stockdill (General Manager, Industrial Relations Service,
Department of Labour) and D. J. Martin (Assistant Commissioner, State Services Commission) to
Minister of Labour and Minister of State Services (Nov. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Stockdill & Martin]. Despite this caution, in 1991 access to legal aid was tightened. See Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal, supra note 80, at 56. Eligibility was set at less than $NZ2000 per year disposable
income and less than $NZ2000 of disposable capital, levels so low as to "effectively preclude[ ]
legal aid for most claimants, except the most destitute, or ironically those who are already unem-
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It would be inaccurate to claim that lawyers are innately incapable
of participating in mediation; lawyers have many relevant skills, includ-

ing negotiating, conciliating, and researching." However, in this case,
lawyers and consultants were not drawn to mediation by the opportunity

to exercise those skills so much as by their perception that mediation offered a new source of income.' At the ECA's enactment, there was literally an explosion of new employment practitioners.' 66 Half the advertisers in a 1991 employment handbook were legal firms and others
offering their representational services. 6 Within the ECA's first year,

there were between 50 to 100 labor consultants competing for work."
Wheeler Campbell, for example, set up a bargaining agency and advo-

cacy service (not including mediation or adjudication) charging
$NZ5.00 a week per person for groups of under five and $NZ3.00 per
person for groups over fifty, amounts essentially in the range of union
fees.'69 Typical legal charges are $NZ150-300 per hour.'70
The new labor representatives came from many backgrounds.

Some had gained experience as employer negotiators, often for the
Employers Association or one of its affiliates,

their training as union representatives.

while others received

However, many lacked any ex-

ployed and have no reason to seek the services of the Employment Tribunal." Id.
164. Cf.Sato, supra note 1, at 514.
165. New Zealand legal practice underwent a transformation from being a profession to a
business during the 1980s. See Michael J. Powell, Business Management and the Professions: The
Changing Nature of the New Zealand Legal Profession, in CONTROLLING INTERESTS: BusINESs,
THE STATE AND SOciETy IN NEW ZEALAND 208 (John Deeks & Nick Perry eds., 1992). When the
ECA was proposed, the United Food and Chemical Workers Union predicted:
In the rush that will follow enactment of this legislation New Zealand will see a plethora of "consultants and experts" offering their services to groups of workers. Their interests will be profit motivated and based on expediencies, rather than on the overall
needs of the workers, or indeed, the enterprise breeding another sector of society with
parasitical tendencies.
United Food & Chemical Workers Union of New Zealand, Submission on the Employment Contracts Bill 13 (Feb. 6, 1991).
166. See Yvonne Oldfield, The Employment Tribunal: A View From the Inside, LABOUR
NoTEs, Sept. 1994, at 11.
167. See id.
168. See Patricia Herbert, Negotiators Flourish in the World of Contracts, PRESS, Feb. 20,
1992, at 7; see also We've Arrived, But the Work's Just Starting,THE EMPLOYER 1 (June 1991).
169. See Rebecca Macfie, First Salvo Fired in BargainingBids, NAT'L Bus. REV., May 8,
1991, at 3. By 1994, non-lawyer advocates were receiving $NZ600 a day for a hearing. See
Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal,supranote 80, at 55.
170. See Big Bucks Beckon BargainingAgents, PSA J. 2 (July 1991).
171. See Herbert, supra note 168, at 7.
172. See Interview with Francis Wevers, supra note 139; see, e.g., Herbert, supranote 168, at
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perience with employment law and resolving workplace disputes."'
Some lawyers had no copy of the statute, relying instead on common
law contract concepts.' 74
At first, mediation was a bit of a mystery to some lawyers who argued
their case across the table comfortably enough but then didn't seem to
know how to negotiate and cut a deal. That, of course, had long been
the very bread and butter of the union officials and their Employers'
Association counterparts.' 75
The new entrants easily lost sight of the fact that it was not the mediator
they needed to persuade but the other party. 76
One lawyer said he observes lawyers approaching "litigation in a
military fashion, ie [sic] on the basis of the more firepower (in terms of
weight of paper) that they can generate in any given case, the more
likely they are to be successful."'" Their training may encourage them
to focus more on the process of litigating and lose sight of issues personal to the grievant or to overall justice,'78 especially when they see it
as being to their own and their client's advantage. They may not understand the need to focus on the parties' motivations - to seek revenge,
have a day in court, clear one's name, receive payment, or be reinstated
- and how these make resolution more or less possible.
This enormous influx of new types of practitioners has had an impact on mediation, including increasing adversarialness, and this impact
has many causes. It is assumed that lawyers are necessarily adversarial,
so more adversarialness might be assumed to be caused by increasing
numbers of lawyers. In the United States, lawyers are often seen as
one-or even "the"--source of adversarialness. Lawyers' education,
which is designed to prepare them to be litigators, certainly prompts
them to frame problems in terms of legal norms.' 9 However, assuming a
simple cause and effect relationship between more lawyers and increased adversarialness ignores the complex ways by which the new
practitioners--consultants as well as lawyers-have affected ECA me173. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
174. See MacDonald, supra note 87, at 28, 30.
175. GARDINER, supra note 61, at 6.
176. See Alastair Dumbleton, The Employment Tribunal - Four Years On, 21 N.Z. J. INDUS.
REL. 21, 25 (1996).
177. Kenneth Johnston, Costs in the Employment Area, EMPL. L. BULL. 2 (Jan. 1994).
178. Cf Richard Weisberg, The Hermeneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of the Grotesque, With a ClassroomExercise on Vichy Law, 17 CARD. L. REv. 1875, 1875-77 (1996).
179. See, e.g., Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 L. & Soc'Y REv. 565, 570
(1992); Goldberg, supranote 7, at 661-65, 671-72.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol17/iss1/2

26

Dannin: Contracting Mediation: The Impact of Different Statutory Regimes
1999]

ContractingMediation

diation.
The entry of the new practitioners signals the entry of new classes
of litigants. Under the LRA, only union members had access to mediation.8 Others took their cases to the common law courts where their
rights were litigated.' Personal grievance mediation was handled by a
small cadre of professional, trained representatives on both sides: for the
most part salaried union organizers represented workers, and salaried
Employers Association representatives or advocates represented employers. They were people with a strong background in and understanding of industrial relations and the conditions of particular industries. 2
Most new representatives lack experience in dealing with industrial
matters in general and specific industry history, modes of operation, or
needs. 3
Not only did representatives in the past have deep experience in
workplace issues, they had ongoing relations with one another.' Employer and union representatives knew there was no such thing as just
one case. They knew they would have multiple contacts with one another extending over many years and existing outside any one dispute or
employment relationship. This meant that they went into each mediation
knowing one another, able to anticipate how each would behave, and
knowing they would be interacting many times in the future; all this is
to say they were conscious they acted within many long-term relationships. In addition, they understood that any specific dispute existed
within a web of ongoing relationships - between the employer and particular employee, the employee and other employees, the employer and
its other employees, the employer and union, the union and its members,
and the workplace within the industry and larger society.
This representational ecosystem has now been displaced. The drop
in union representation left a vacuum that was filled by the new repre180. See LRA § 209(d).
181. See id.
182. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21.
183. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supranote 127.
184. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21.
185. Andrew Little, legal counsel for the Engineers Union, observed that unions approach
grievances or other legal actions differently than do lawyers in private practice. They first try to
avoid the need for a third party by vigorously trying to sort the problem out on the job. See
GARDINER, supra note 61, at 12; cf.Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 17, 25-26 (1983). Other areas of law, such as regulatory policymaking
by government agencies also can involve litigation within and as part of ongoing relationships. See
Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory
Process, 30 L. & Soc'Y REv. 735, 737 (1996).
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sentatives. Mediator Yvonne Oldfield observed that in her first three
months on the Tribunal she had only three to four cases brought by unions. 86 Consultants were far more in evidence:
These consultants (working usually on a commission basis) fill a market niche for workers who are not unionised and cannot afford the expertise of specialist employment lawyers. There are probably many
reasons for this - low levels of unionisation perhaps as well as a tendency of union officials to settle problems without recourse to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has undoubtedly provided a growth industry for consultants and lawyers. The majority of employers appearing there appear to be small firms. Larger finms, perhaps, are more likely to be
unionised and/or to manage basic personnel functions (like pay systems) better.In
The Mediation Service itself recognized the importance of these
relational skills and of teaching them to disputants to avoid future disputes, as well as settling the substantive issues in dispute.'88 The enactment of the ECA, however, refocused attention on the immediate dispute and the short term.
b. Changing Work from a Relationship to a Contract or Market
Exchange
ECA proponents opposed including a personal grievance provision
in the ECA.8i 9 They continue to take the position that doing so was a
mistake and that what has developed is an outmoded conflict-model of
labor relations that distorted the ECA's contractual and market basis.'
Others contended that market forces cannot promote successful mediation because it must be based in an awareness of the ongoing relationship. In 1991, the Mediation Service argued that, although a right may
be established in a contract or a grievance procedure, differences between the parties "will inevitably be accompanied within the work place
by differences in personalities, philosophies, and general understand-

186. See Oldfield, supranote 166, at 11.
187. laM
188. See Mediation Service, supra note 51, at 3.

189. See N.Z. Bus. Roundtable, Moving into the FastLane 32 (Mar. 1996).
190. See id.
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ing."' 9 It thus follows, the Mediation Service said, that the ongoing nature of the employment relationship means there is both a legal and personal aspect to the relationship.lre This requires a dispute resolution
process which is more than merely a legal one:
Agreement is important, not only to overcoming the immediate impasse, but to encourage the effective future operation of their on-going
relationship. Dispute and grievance procedures therefore involve a
committee procedure where the initial, and most important obligation,
is on the parties to voluntarily resolve their own differences. This primary objective is distinctively different from the Tribunal or Court
where issues are determined on behalf of the parties, according to rules
of evidence, and procedure designed specifically to keep the distance
between the Tribunal or Court, and the disputant parties."'
The Mediation Service explained that the process which the grievance committee first engages in allowed the mediator to acquaint parties
with the law, "improve [their] personal relationships, and to plan to
avoid future disputes."" Judge Goddard, then Chief Judge of the Labour
Court, observed: "It is not so often a question of deciding between
conflicting accounts of the facts as of deciding between competing interpretations and perceptions of undisputed facts."' 9 5 He pointed out that
"there are two or three or even more disparate communities of rightthinking persons whose differing ideologies and employment cultures
are entitled to consideration when it comes to determining the justice of
a particular case."96

This underscores the problem created by an influx of representatives and grievants with no background in labor relations and oriented
towards seeing employment problems as isolated cases. An inexperi-

191.

Mediation Service, supra note 51, at 1.

192. See id. at 2.
193. Id. The importance to unions of the relationship can be seen in the following checklist
for a union considering whether to seek an injunction: 1) whether this is more of an industrial dispute than a legal matter, 2) the relative speed of procedures; 3) whether there is an ongoing relationship between employer, employee, and union; 4) the existence of any time or statutory limits;
5) prospects of success under different procedures; 6) whether equity and good conscience support
the claim; 7) the nature of an employer as an opponent; 8) the existence of favorable precedent; 9)
costs; 10) who bears the burden of proof; 11) the past record, reputation and history of the employer; 12) the employer's financial situation; and 13) union policy. See Peter Fenton, Preparation
and Advocacy: Injunctions /Interim Orders 1 (Sept. 1993).
194. Mediation Service, supranote 51, at 3.
195. Judge C. Goddard, Employment Contracts Bill, Comments By the Chief Judge of the
Labour Court 14.

196. Id.
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enced practitioner might see a dispute as merely an individual's disagreement and as just a case, just something to be won, just something to

generate income. A more experienced representative, in contrast, would
understand the dispute was enmeshed and intertwined with the enter-

prise's viability.' 97 What has thus come to exist is
an apriori [sic] system which attempts to place a monetary value on a
failed employment contract.... In practice the Employment Tribunal
has become little more than a clearing house for unjustifiably dismissed employees, with its primary role as [arbiter] of the labour market, deciding the economic worth of the unjustifiably dismissed. 98
With the relationship aspect of work now absent from the legislation, representatives are less likely to look at the long-term. In their
training manual, Nicola Crutchley and Virginia Hardy tried to address

this problem by emphasizing that although employment law is about
employment contracts, attorneys must recognize that employment dis-

putes operate within a framework of personal relationships within the
workplace and beyond.' 99 They observed that lawyers must recognize
that a dispute is also about how to maintain, develop or sometimes dissolve the relationship. This requires recognizing the range of interests
involved in achieving a practical and lasting relationship.'0'

New entrant representatives operating in a contractual, rather than a
relational regime, are less likely to understand that, in certain contexts,

mediation-and even litigation-exist as a normal part of the adjustments necessary in an ongoing relationship, that they actually need not

excite lasting acrimony.' It is easier to maintain cordial relations and

197. Cf. Sato, supra note 1,at 511-12.
198. Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal, supra note 80, at 56. Despite the changed nature
of mediation, many mediators still talk as if the cases are relational, ignoring the reality of the
process they are engaged in. As Service Workers Union representative Alastair Duncan put it:
It's the divorce settlement and yet you will still get a number, and in fact, just about
every mediator, if you simply take a precis of what they say in the opening, you really
would think that this is marriage guidance. That you had two equal parties with some
strain in the relationship.
Well, if six months ago your violent partner throws you out of the house and you wait
six months to go to marriage guidance. I've got a concern that this mediation process is
in fact ignoring the enormous power imbalances that exist.
Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105.
199. See Crutchley & Hardy, supranote 151, at 2.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. An example of litigation not disturbing an ongoing relationship exists in environmental
disputes. See Coglianese, supranote 185, at 737.
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take a long term view when disputing takes place between organizations. 3 In the LRA context, even though a personal grievance involved
an individual employee and often a small employer, the central role
played by representatives of the union and Employers Association
shifted the process of disputing and resolution to a less personal one
taking place between institutions. Their presence also meant that much
grievance handling took place outside the arena of mediation and in a
way that fostered the relationship. Union representatives acted as filters
in determining which claims to file as grievances.' They also were
available to defuse and channel worker anger. In contrast, the purpose of
the ECA in focusing on the individual makes disputes and mediation
personal. 5 Employer and employee representatives - even when they
continue to be the Employers Association and a union - act as individual agents appointed to act in this discrete matter.
Some management consultants not only do not work to defuse and
depersonalize disputes, they have actively encouraged anti-union, antagonistic attitudes among employers "and openly promote[d] union
busting policies." 6 Work is so important to each of us-employer or
employee-that when a dispute occurs it is easy for tensions to increase
and for the dispute to become intensely personal, especially in a small
company and under any system. An example can be observed in the
Tangent Tanners submission on the ECA:
Small business succeeds on the backs of hard working enterprenuerial [sic] individuals and couples who are prepared to risk everything
for a return that is often not commensurate with the effort. Such people
rely on their wits to make it work and are unable to afford professional
assistance when faced with any problem.
203. See id. at 749.
204. See Harbridge, Recent Industrial Disputes, supra note 72, at 9. Unions could act as a gobetween:
A worker who has been unfairly treated may choose to go straight to the employer to
talk about the problem. But this does not have to be done; the worker can go straight to
the union - the shop steward if there is one or else the organiser. This should be done as
soon as possible.
The shop steward or the organiser will talk to the employer. Their aim should be to
solve the problem at this stage in the fastest possible way.
NEW ZEALAND AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING AND RELATED TRADES INDUSTRIAL UNION OF
WORKERS, supra note 111, at 38.
205. Cf.Coglianese, supra note 185, at 753.
206. Gordon Anderson & Pat Walsh, Labour's New Deal: A BargainingFramework for a
New Century?, 18 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 163, 172 (1993); see also Janet Hector et a, Industrial Relations Bargaining in the Retail Non-food Sector: 1991-1992, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 326, 332
(1993) (changes in representation in the retail sector).
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In a typical case a worker who doesn't fit in the close knit small
business team can hold the employer to ransom. No matter how won-

derful the dismissal proceedure [sic] may be it ignores the type of individual that operates our small businesses. They are not the type to
enter into the charade of warnings and other bally hoo when an inadequate employee lacks the basic decency to admit that their face doesnt

[sic] fit.m

Mediation under the LRA was designed for primary involvement

by nonlawyers."3 Procedures were less formal." The law provided that

no case should fail for want of form, and outcomes depended as much
on equity and good conscience as law. 20 ECA mediation is not a com-

fortable forum for nonlawers. Now, if a grievant fails to file proper formal pleadings, the case must be amended and refiled. 1 Where before
matters might be handled through phone calls, the ECA requires the
parties to reduce everything to writing, so that five to ten page statements of facts are now common.2 2 Union and employer representatives
feel that it was easier to resolve matters informally and more quickly
under LRA mediation.2 3

The presence of lawyers in this environment contributes to making
the environment more legalistic.21 4 Lawyers are trained to resolve dis-

putes in a formal environment, while union and Employer Association
207. M. J. Pausina, Submission to Labour Committee from Tangent Tanners Limited (Feb. 5,
1991) (on file with author).
208. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105.
209. See id.
210. See DEmKS, supranote 22, at 381-85; see also, e.g., Interview with Alastair Duncan, sitpranote 105.
211. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
212. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105; Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra
note 21.
213. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21; see also Anna Dunbar, Cards Today
'Stacked Against Employer,' PRESS, Sept. 14, 1994, at 1. Small employers are also harmed by facing a more experienced representative, as was noted in an employer's experience under the LRA.
It is at this point that timely action by the Union concerned could clean up the problem
but that does not happen. Instead the Union, used to dealing with employers with large
numbers of people, goes straight to P.G. Claims, a process which the small businessman
cannot understand and often cannot afford the time or money to find out about. From
this point on the small businessman is dead meat in an environment that he cant [sic]
understand, and at the mercy of a system that could not care less about him as the ritual
is played out and the legislation followed to the letter by those who are well paid to do
SO.
Pausina, supra note 207.
214. See Labour Select Committee, Report of the Labour Committee on the Inquiry Into the
Effects of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 on the New Zealand Labour Market 46 (1993)
(Majority Report).
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representatives were accustomed to greater informality. Union representatives see the Tribunal or Court as a last resort.21 5 Lawyers have traditionally been trained to think more abstractly about cases and legal doctrine and to make more technical or legalistic arguments, as opposed to
focusing on the role a particular dispute plays in that ongoing relationship,21 6 and this is a reasonable response to contract legislation. Some
mediators try to level the mediation playing field by requiring lawyers
to use plain language so they can be understood by the nonlawyers involved in the mediation. 7 In some cases, such a requirement has put
lawyers at a disadvantage because the lawyers became nervous or found
it difficult to present their cases when required to use plain language. 8
The result is mediation as a clash, not only of disputants, but of cultures
and language.
Unions have been forced to respond to these changes in law and
representatives by hiring their own legal officers. 219 Non-union member
employees have also sought out lawyers, because for them, the loss of
employment is a high-priority problem in the depressed New Zealand
economy. "With everything to lose (but probably already lost), they
have invariably chosen to pursue financial compensation by legal
means, and in doing so, have defeated the Act's intention to maintain a
low-level system of dispute resolution."
All this means is that ECA mediation is being shaped by employee
groups and interests which were not part of the process in years past: by
the entry of new sorts of representatives with little or no experience with
workplace issues; by those with strong training in other disciplines
which they then bring into mediation; by those with a contractual rather
than a relational orientation; and even by those opposed to basic tenets
of industrial relations.
c. New Methods of Paying Representatives
In debates on the ECA, MP Ian Revell praised what he anticipated
215. See Interview with Duignan & Donaldson, supranote 127. Even union lawyers tended to
see cases differently from organisers. They might feel they needed to make a list of questions for
the organisers because they felt organisers often missed details important to the lawyer. See, e.g.,
Interview with Lucy Highfield, supra note 130.
216. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
217. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, supranote 21.

218. See id.
219. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105; Labour Select Committee, supra

note 214, at 46.
220.

Skiffmgton, The Employment Tribunal,supranote 80, at 56.
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would be the informality and accessibility of the ECA and said that the

Government was not interested in providing a "lawyers' feast."

1

Of

course, it did just that. New representatives were attracted to mediation
as a lucrative new source of income. Some, more prescient than MP
Revell, predicted just this outcome.m The question of how the lawyers

would be paid didn't trouble the ECA's theoreticians, but the reality for
most workers is captured in a submission on the ECA written by Harry
Harris, a grocery store clerk with two young children. m He explained
that he grossed $NZ339 a week, including overtime, and netted
$NZ270. m This was $NZ50 less than he could receive on the dole.m

Like Harris, most employees could afford union representation which
cost about $NZ1.50-$NZ4.00 a week but, as Harris observed, he could
not afford to pay the representatives that were supposed to enter the
market.

As the level of union membership has declined, union representation is less available. In the main, unions, which are struggling financially, are not willing to represent a grievant who is not already a member.'"For people like Harris, there is less access to unions, less ability to

221. See PARL. DEB. (2d Sess.) 1463 (1991) (N.Z.).
222. See Memorandum from Stockdill & Martin, supra note 163, at 2.
223. See Letter from Harry J. Harris to the Labour Select Committee (Feb. 8, 1991) (on file
with author).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Jane Adams & Carol Brown, A Warning: Why You Must Belong to NOVO, NURSING
NZ 33 (Apr. 1995); Philippa Branthwaite, Who Gives You the Best Deal?, NZ NURSING J.9 (July
1991). Karen Roper, Public Service Association Assistant General Secretary for Research and
Publicity, observed that the union was initially concerned about handling personal grievances if
demand for them were to grow, as seemed likely. See Karen Roper, The New Act's Effects on
Public Sector Employees 7 (paper for Longman Professional Conference on the Employment
Contracts Act, May 8, 1991). She was confident that the union could keep the basic membership
fees low and still guarantee a basic level of service to all members, allowing the nonprofit PSA to
compete with lawyers and private agents. See id.
227. Unions vary in their willingness to assist a nonmember worker. Some refuse, while others are willing to help if they have the time. Those with a general policy of refusing may provide
assistance if it seems likely to further union goals, such as organizing a plant, or because the case
involves an important point of law. See Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107; Interview
with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127; Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21; Interview with Lucy Highfield, supra note 130. Not all people who join unions want to start a formal
personal grievance process, but most realize they may want union support in negotiating employment conditions or supporting them in workplace disputes.
I suppose it's the other end of the spectrum to the debate as to why people join unions.
They don't join the Service Workers Union for a health insurance program. They don't
join for our superannuation program. I think most people who join the Service Workers
Union also don't join for color television or for a finance plan or for a wine club, which
other unions have promoted. People join because, at the end, of the day they've either
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pursue a grievance within a more formal, legalized process, and no abil-

ity to pay a representative whose fees could be higher than any recovery.m For people with low wages and thus no likelihood of a large recovery, even with the recent development of contingent fees may not
provide access." 9 If lawyers' presence shapes the system into one in
which having a lawyer becomes necessary to success, then those whose
cases cannot attract a lawyer - because the grievant cannot afford a lawyer or the case is unlikely to generate a large enough award - will beand are being-shut out of the system."0 Many wage earners who are
not members of unions are not taking cases to mediation, because they

cannot afford to."
On the other hand, the cost of the new representatives has been a
factor pushing settlement, especially when the worker is represented by
a union. A mediator can explain to an employer that the case has so far
cost it several thousands of dollars and will cost more, whereas, the union member is paying only a $NZ4 weekly fee and is not getting a lawyer's bill. 2 If an employee is represented by a lawyer, the high fees put
pressure on the worker to settle quickly.23' Unions have tried to advertise
membership as providing cheap representation in the case of a personal
grievance,' but the slide in union membership has nonetheless contingot a problem or they can perceive that they need someone to stand along side them
and, if necessary, give the boss the fingers.
Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105.
228. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127. ECA monetary remedies are
so low they should provide almost no incentive to pursue a grievance and on the employer's part
not to settle immediately. A worker who has been discharged might still file a personal grievance
to gain reinstatement. Reinstatement, however, has always been uncommon. Under the LRA, reinstatement was the primary remedy for an unjustified dismissal. See LRA § 228(1). However, it was
only ordered in 17% of cases; the ECA does not give reinstatement primacy as a remedy, and reinstatement is ordered in only 4.4% of successful adjudicated grievances. See Christine French &
Paul Tremewan, Empl. L. Update 40 (Nov.-Dec. 1994) (N.Z. L. Soc. Seminar). This very low level
of reinstatement means grievances are less a makewhole remedy than a vehicle for making transfer
payments from employer to employee. See id.
229. See MacDonald, supra note 87, at 28-29. The complex array of ways in which lawyers
and consultants are paid merits further study. Experience with United States civil cases suggests
that hourly fee arrangements can have an impact on the way cases are conducted but so can the
side an attorney represents. See Herbert Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangementon Lawyer
Effort, 19 L. & Soc'Y REV. 251,262-64 (1985).
230. See Labour Select Committee, supra note 214, at 46.
231. See id.
232. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105. An employer's lawyer told the union representative his fees were $NZ30,000 for a case involving a two-day hearing. See Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal,supra note 80, at 56.
233. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
234. See, e.g., Membership pamphlets and advertisements from the Service Workers Union,
Engineers Union, and Public Service Association (on file with author).
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In fact, some unemployed grievants do pay representative's fees. 6
Factors driving this include not only the dramatic drop in union membership, 7 but also the influx of new employees entitled to bring personal grievances," These are mainly higher level employees and managers who have no history of union representation, who2 9are more
accustomed to lawyers, and who also can afford lawyers fees.
The form of representatives' payment can influence the process of
mediation. Under the LRA, employer industry groups provided repre-

sentation and advice as a benefit of membership, just as unions represented workers.2 ° When employer and union representatives were paid a
salary, they had an incentive to resolve problems as quickly as possible

to lower their case loads. The new representatives who bill hourly lack
such an incentive to early resolution,'" because they can benefit from
more procedural formality and slower settlements.2 2 Hourly paid repre-

sentatives will not necessarily cause delay to pad their bills; they may
feel they need to appear strong and aggressive in the hope of being retained in future cases.
d. Changes in Tribunal Adjudication

Although the focus of this article is substantive law's impact on
mediation, there were changes in procedure that also contributed to al-

tering the nature of mediation under the ECA. What is particularly interesting is that some seemingly less significant procedures made out-

size contributions to transforming employment mediation in New
Zealand. Among these are matters such as making a transcript and the
scope of appeal from Tribunal adjudications. In LRA mediation there
235. For a discussion of the ways in which the ECA has decreased union membership, see
DANNiN, WORKNG FREE, supra note 20, at 167-303.
236. Ian Bray, the Hotel Association's executive director, yearned for a return to pre-ECA
days when "most disputes were settled amicably and swiftly because there was little or no financial
benefit to union delegates to prolong disputes." Dunbar, supra note 204, at 1.
237. See Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107; Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127; Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21; Interview with Lucy Highfield,
supra note 130.
238. See GARDINER, supra note 61, at 6.
239. See Labour Select Committee, supra note 214, at 45.
240. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21.
241. See id. In the past union and employer negotiators knew each other and worked together.
Now lawyers take the view "let's make a quid out of it!" MacDonald, supra note 87, at 28, 30.
242. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127; Interview with Alastair
Duncan, supranote 105; Kritzer, supranote 229, at 570.
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was no sworn evidence nor transcript.243 The committee composition and
process required the parties to be actively engaged in seeking an agreed
settlement.24 If none was reached, the committee made a majority decision, which in splits meant following the mediator's decision. 24 A de
novo appeal could be taken to the Labour Court, 2so the parties entered
mediation knowing they could retry the case there. 4
The need to record evidence in adjudications because appeals are
no longer de novo means the Employment Tribunal needs more equipment and staff. This makes it harder to arrange a hearing at short notice
and makes the Tribunal a place that is increasingly formal and legalistic.247

The ECA made Employment Tribunal arbitration decisions binding, with appeal only on points of law."5 The Clerical Workers Union
correctly predicted this would make mediation a more formal, adversarial process.249 It contended that the value of mediation was in promoting
settlement through an "informal and frank atmosphere" which was essentially a "mediated negotiation." 0 It further argued that "[t]he functions of Mediation and final tribunal of facts are simply not compatible"
and predicted that the change would lengthen mediation hearings, require lawyers, and increase expense and time."1 Labour Court Chief
Judge Goddard expressed strong reservations about giving binding adjudicative powers to mediators, many of whom lacked legal training:
"They will be the only statutory adjudicators with such far-reaching
powers who are not required to meet criteria of legal qualification and
minimum experience." 2
Although binding adjudication occurs after mediation, this change
in the personal grievance process has transformed mediation into a pre243. See Neville Taylor, The Employment Tribunal BuLL. 102 (Sept. 1996).

Is There a Better Way?, EMPL. L.

244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See Labour Select Committee, supra note 214, at 46.
248. See ECA § 104.
249. See New Zealand Clerical Workers Union, Submission to the Labour Select Committee
on the Employment Contracts Bill 29 (Feb. 1991) (on file with author).

250. Id. at 40.
251. Id. at 29.
252. Goddard, supra note 195, at 16. Minister of Labour Bill Birch described the new mediators' backgrounds: Tribunal members are not required to be legally qualified. They are appointed
based on specialist expertise and knowledge in industrial relations and applying employment law.
These skills can be acquired in many ways, not solely legal education. Five have legal qualifications, many came from the Mediation Service, and the rest have extensive industrial relations ex-

perience. See 43 PAIRL. DEB. (2d Sess.) 4550 (1991) (N.Z.).
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trial process. Discovery is not available for personal grievances,"'3so
those interested in winning grievances rather than resolving them use
mediation for discovery.2 This makes the parties less open during mediation and makes settlement more difficult. United Food and Beverage
Workers Union representatives Neville Donaldson and Campbell Duignan described the situation in the Dunedin area as follows:
ND: I have had instances where I have presented my argument in mediation. The employer or the lawyer have taken an immediate adjournment and then have advised the adjudicator or the chairperson
that they have no wish to settle and will not be reappearing and just
gone on and said this goes to adjudication. And then they have gone
away and presented their case based on the facts presented.
CD: Just used it as is a fishing expedition basically.
ND: Yeah. So when I approach mediation now I approach it on the
basis of providing the absolute minimum of argument, if you'd like,
that I think is necessary if they're there to genuinely settle the case to
resolve it. I do not as a practice present all my argument at mediation. I
will always keep one or two key issues that I think are important up
my sleeve5 in case I'm up against an employer who has no intention of
settling.2 '
Service Workers Union representative Alastair Duncan had similar
experiences in the Wellington area: "What it does raise is the question
of whether you play all your cards in the mediation process.""
Even lawyers have criticized this development:
Establishing a contractual system of employment relations has led to
increased formality and the diminishing role of unions has left employees with no option but to engage the services of lawyers or advocates to resolve their employment disputes. Mediation at the Tribunal
has become a legal forum where advocates with vested economic interests argue against each other from prepared mediation statements,
acting out choreographed tactical exchanges designed to assess the op253. See Phillipa Muir, Effect on Personal Grievance and Sexual Harassment 11. For an example of how lawyers were advised to handle cases, see French & Tremewan, supra note 228, at
24-51.
254. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
255. Id.
256. Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105.
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position's arguments rather than resolve the dispute.257

Even if settlement is unlikely, mediation cannot be avoided because participating in it is the only way to get a timely adjudication
hearing' s In these cases, mediation is not flling the role intended for it
and ties up mediation resources unnecessarily.
3. Increased Filings and Delay
The key complaint heard about mediation is that it now takes much
longer than under the LRA. Despite having doubled the number of Employment Tribunal members-roughly reflecting the increase in those
able to file PGs under the ECA-case filings have so increased that the
Tribunal remains seriously backlogged2 9
Before the ECA, mediations usually took place in a week to a
month following a request.&° Organiser Neville Donaldson explained:
If I had to wait more than a week I was absolutely bloody raving.
Raving. If I had a case, I'd ring Walter Grills, who is our local mediator. Now if I couldn't get him to that factory, right there and then, I
would expect he would be hearing [us] within a day at his offices.26

In 1990, employer Carter Holt Harvey complained that a few cases
under the LRA had taken as long as three months to get a hearing
scheduled. Y2 Now waiting periods in the largest urban areas are three to
nine months for mediation.f 3 In less urbanized areas, delays can be as
much as eight months for mediation.' One lawyer noted: "Of particular
concern is the recent increase in withdrawals (up to 47% for adjudications), which may indicate applicants are just giving up on the proc257. Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way, supra note 24, at 24.
258. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supranote 127.
259. See Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way, supra note 24, at 23-24; see also Dumbleton, supra note 176, at 24; Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107; Interview with Duignan
and Donaldson, supra note 127; Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105.
260. See Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra note 21; Interview with Duignan and Donaldson,
supra note 127.
261. Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127. Others shared Neville Donaldson's view. See Interview with Graeme Clark, supra note 107; Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra
note 21.
262. See Carter Holt Harvey Ltd., Submissions to the Parliamentary Select Committee on the
Employment Contracts Bill 24 (1991).
263. See Skiffington, There Must Be a Better Way, supra note 24, at 23-24; Dumbleton, supra
note 176, at 24; Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127; Interview with Alastair
Duncan, supranote 105.
264. See Taylor, supra note 243, at 101.
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ess."
No doubt some of the delay is caused by doubling personal grievance jurisdiction. Most of the Employment Tribunal's work involves
personal grievances concerning unjustified dismissal. In the year ending
June 1996, eighty-four percent of the cases mediated or adjudicated
were personal grievances for unjustified dismissal.2 " This does not,
however, fully explain the delay. Doubling personal grievance jurisdiction does not mean doubling all Tribunal work. Under the ECA media-

tors also lost certain sorts of jurisdiction and other sorts of cases have
declined as a result of the decline in collective bargaining.26 The num-

ber of mediators has been doubled, though certainly some backlog resulted from the government's failing to appoint mediators from the
ECA's effective date of May 15 till August 19, 1991.26 Some of the
backlog and delay is also likely attributable to the fact that the fourteen
people appointed to the Tribunal included only eight former media-

tors.269 Thus when mediators were finally appointed, only half were experienced mediators.20 In 1994, additional members were appointed to

bring the Tribunal to twenty-four full-time equivalents, but only fifty
percent had a mediation background.27
In addition to these problems, some of the delay appears attributable not just to more potential grievants but to the fact that the new jurisdiction brought different sorts of employees into mediation-

members of middle management, many of whom were affected by
workplace restructuring and whose cases tend to be more complicated

265. Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal,supra note 80, at 55.
266. See Harbridge, Recent Industrial Disputes, supra note 72, at 8.
267. A major part of the mediator's work under the LRA involved mediating disputes of interests. See LRA §§ 132-151. The ECA contains no such provision.
268. During the ECA's drafting, Industrial Relations Service Manager Ralph Stockdill and
Assistant State Services Commissioner D.J. Martin noted that extending jurisdiction meant a
commitment to providing an adequate forum: "[c]learly the resourcing implications for the Mediation Service and Labour Court are considerable." Memorandum from Stockdill & Martin, supra
note 163, at 5; see also GARDINER, supra note 61, at 2.
269. See Rebecca Macfie, Legal, Industrial Mix on Tribunal, NAT'L Bus. REv., Aug. 14,
1991, at 3; 43 PARL. DEB. (2d Sess.) 3981 (1991) (N.Z.).
270. See GARDINER, supra note 61, at 2. It had less work conciliating disputes of interest. See
id. at 2-3. Some ECA supporters believed that most would opt out of the statutory procedures because they would be too slow. See 43 PARL. DEB. (2d Sess.) 1458 (1991) (N.Z.). This suggests that
adequate resources were not provided, because the government thought they would not be needed.
The problem of delay and its linkage to insufficient mediators continues. The 1996 Coalition
Agreement between the National and the New Zealand First Parties. Coalition Agreement - Policy
Area: Industrial Relations (Dec. 6, 1996) item number six stated that it would boost resources for
Employment Tribunal and Court.
271. See Skiffington, The Employment Tribunal,supra note 80, at 55, 57.
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and take more time than "wage earners' cases. 272 These cases had more
money at stake, and the grievants had a greater propensity and ability to

use attorneys273 - all of which contributes to delay.
Delay has also been caused by the complex task of trying to interpret and apply radically different legislation, which also had serious
drafting flaws. 274 Throughout the period unemployment has been high,275
making employees less able to find alternative employment after a termination. This made them more interested in pursuing a grievance

rather than moving on. Even more important, the government introduced a six month bar from receiving unemployment benefits if termination was justified at the same time the ECA was enacted. 6
Delay is a serious problem for grievants who have been dismissed.
Not only do they lose pay, but, as time goes by, reinstatement becomes
less likely. Over time an employer may restructure a job out of existence
or the employee may find a new job and not want to return to what is
seen as an abusive situation."7 Delay frustrates and demoralizes the
grievant, friends, and family, as well as affecting other employees in
the workplace.2 9 As time passes they lose any connection between the
harm suffered, their own rights, and the efficacy of law.' 0 The situation
is not likely to improve. There is strong pressure to transfer ECA jurisdiction to the common law courts,"1 where delay is much greaterf 2 This
will further decrease the value of personal grievances to employees.

272. See Labour Select Committee, supranote 214, at 45.
273. Lawyers cause delay by making formal, legalistic arguments and because it is more difficult to reschedule a case quickly. See id.
274. The ECA was drafted to embody an ideology. Its drafters assumed that all problems
would be resolved by the market. See generally DANNIN, WORKING FREE, supra note 20, at 88114,304-15.
275. See id. at 88. "239,700 jobless out of a working-age population of 2,219,500 with no
sign of improvement." Id.
276. See N.Z. Employers Fed'n, Submission to the Labour Parliamentary Select Committee
on the Review of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, at 16 (May 26, 1993). The NZEF argued
that delay and the increase in cases was not due to employers acting more aggressively but, rather,
to increased Tribunal jurisdiction and removing the de novo appeal to the Court, as well as increased employee incentive to file personal grievances. See id.
277. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supra note 105; Interview with Joyce Hawe, supra
note 21.
278. See Interview with Duignan and Donaldson, supra note 127.
279. See Interview with Alastair Duncan, supranote 105.
280. See id.
281. See Anderson, The Judiciary,supra note 89; see also, Anderson, FurtherRefonns, supra
note 89, at 2.
282. See French & Tremewan, supranote 228, at 24, 27.
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II. DISCUSSION
When the ECA was pending in Parliament, Electricity Corporation
asserted that mediation and adjudication were distinctly different: "A
mediator will have a good idea of what is acceptable to the parties,
whereas the Court will consider what is correct according to the wording of the award or agreement." ' This, it predicted, would necessarily
produce different results from mediation and adjudication.' A similar
view, that mediation is an immutable dispute resolution process and one
which is wholly different than litigation, is currently a powerful force
shaping how disputes will be resolved in the United States. Will establishing mediation as an institution in the United States trial system improve the administration of justice? Is the popular view, which has
prompted this trend, correct in its conclusions and assumptions?
Experience in New Zealand has certainly not borne out this clean
division. Virtually identical institutionalized mediation processes operated under the LRA and ECA. Under the LRA it was an informal, inexpensive, and expeditious method for resolving personal grievances, but
operated under the ECA it was a more formal, more costly, slower, and
less satisfactory process. The ultimate conclusions to be drawn from this
experience is that mediation and adjudication are merely different ways
of disputing. They are both highly dependent on their contexts and are
both affected by forces including contextual changes in substantive law,
resources such as the number of judges, procedural devices such as discovery, greater or less difficulty in preparing one's case, and scope of
appeal, changes in the sorts of litigants covered by the substantive law,
and who representatives are and how they are paid. The New Zealand
experience can provide useful insights into how such an institutionalized
system is likely to operate in the United States.
More interesting than the fact that delay and other changes have resulted from the change in legislation is how these effects flowed from
the changes. For example, it is obvious that extending jurisdiction to
give more people access to file grievances and then delaying appointing
any mediators for three months will cause a backlog and delay. Appointing additional mediators should have relieved the problem by now, but it
has not. One reason appears to be that the ECA did not just double access; it brought in different sorts of grievants. These executives, manag-

283. Electricity Corporation of New Zealand, Submission to the Labour Select Committee on
the Employment Contracts Bill 14 (Feb. 1991).
284. See id.
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ers, and more highly paid workers formerly took their more complex
and higher liability employment disputes to the High Court. These new
grievants (and other sorts of grievants as well) brought lawyers and consultants into mediation, and these new representatives lacked experience
with employment law and how to resolve workplace disputes. The new
representatives and grievants have a wholly different approach to
workplace problems. They have introduced formal, more lawyerly procedures and a short-term contractual case orientation. They tend to see
personal grievances as legal cases rather than as problems in long term
relationships that should be addressed through bargaining. This view is
consistent with and is reinforced by the ECA itself, which conceives of
grievances and disputes as a termination or breach of a contract rather
than as a normal process within a relationship that nonetheless can continue if the problem is properly approached.
It is also true that problems such as greater formality can be attributed to the influx of lawyers into ECA mediation. This has also been affected by the change in the scope of appeal - the sort of subject that
sends law students into a stupor but which practitioners quickly find
shapes how cases are tried and appealed - or not.2 5 As Christchurch
lawyer Neville Taylor observes:
Most persons who have had more than fleeting involvement with the
Employment Tribunal would not describe the way it operates in adjudication as being "low level" or "informal". [sic] Through no fault of
the Tribunal, the procedures have, to varying degrees, become quite
legalistic and formal. Such an approach is time-consuming, expensive,
and less "user friendly" to the lay-person. Within the existing structure,
there is probably no escape from such developments. The statute, despite pretensions to the contrary, requires a degree of intrinsic formality and legal procedure. The statutory design of the adjudication role
and the prospect of appeals to the Employment Court mean that the
Tribunal cannot
effectively deliver the degree of informality that is
6
desirable.2
Removing the de novo appeal means that some may use mediation for
discovery rather than settlement. Once mediation becomes a place to do
discovery and improve one's chances at adjudication the other party
must approach mediation with this understanding and hold back information that if revealed in a mediation context might achieve settlement.

285. See, e.g., Engle Merry, supra note 8, at 2065-66.
286. Taylor, supra note 243, at 102.
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Lawyers and consultants were welcomed into ECA practice on the
grounds that this would offer choice and improve the process. In fact, it
has meant a change in how many mediation representatives make their
living. Representatives in LRA mediation were mainly paid on a salary
basis, which gave them an incentive to resolve problems as quickly as
possible to lower their case loads. The new representatives who bill
hourly lack any incentive to resolve the case early" and may even have
incentives to delay a case, either to increase their pay for a case' or to
persuade the client that one is an aggressive representative who should
be retained or recommended in future cases.
The ECA's institutionalization of mediation and adjudication in the
Employment Tribunal means that parties are less likely to conceive of
mediation as something apart from the legal system. Disputants' views
of what they ought to get is necessarily shaped by what they think their
rights are, which is shaped by what they think the law is, and, to some
degree, what the law actually is. When mediation is institutionalized as
a step in a formal legal process, conceptions of law and legal rights are
ever present and likely to influence party behavior.29
The decline of unions and the ongoing negotiation of workplace
relationships means that most personal grievances are truly personal,
unrooted, and without any perceptible relationship to larger communal
issues or to negotiations past or future. This makes mediation more of a
docket clearing process than a means of achieving just resolutions.9
ECA law is about labor markets filled with buyers and sellers of labor
power; it rejects employment as a relationship. The ECA's focus is on
the moment of contracting, not on fostering ongoing employeeemployer interactions. This transformation means that parties to ECA
mediation, rather than being bargaining partners, are now opponents,
who have little to gain from cooperation.
Keeping the procedural steps the same but eliminating a role for
unions within ECA personal grievances means removing unions as
grievance screeners engaged in early intervention and resolution. Unions no longer have a workplace presence to police compliance with

287. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
288. See supranote 241 and accompanying text.
289. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 65-66 (1996). Attention to the law is unavoidable. Unless parties know what
the law is they cannot make informed decisions, and unrepresented grievants are likely to be uninformed grievants. See id.; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial
Promotionand Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. Rnv. 1339 (1994).
290. See Nolan-Haley, supranote 289, at 86 n.87.
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workplace terms or to provide expertise and support that can keep a personal grievance from becoming solely personal and destructive.
This raises the intriguing realization that hidden within the LRA
was a more important form of ADR than mediation, and that was collective bargaining. Collective bargaining resembles legislation because
it is a way to resolve disputes on a broader and more amicable basis than
individual litigation. Collective bargaining's very nature means taking a
collective, social, and long-term view. It means always being aware of
the relationship at the core of the dispute and trying to resolve disputes
in a way that does not imperil that relationship. This consciousness of
the parties' relationship as the context within which the dispute exists is
a quality often ascribed to mediation."' Collective bargaining, including
contract negotiations, informal workplace dispute resolution, and even
strikes were ways of dealing with workplace problems that prevented
many from ever reaching the stage of a formal filing. With the loss of
collective bargaining in New Zealand and the loss of collective bargaining as a form of dispute resolution, there has been a greater juridification of the employment relationship.
This insight is directly relevant to experience in the United States.
As collective bargaining has declined, a more adversarial and atomized
form of dispute resolution has evolved through the expansion of common law doctrine and the enactment of statutes to protect workers from
employer actions that are seen as violating public policy. These new
causes of action and protections now form a dazzling and rapidly expanding array of tort and contract doctrines, whistleblower and antiretaliation statutes, and anti-discrimination laws. As has been the case in
New Zealand, these causes of action focus on the individual but, in doing so, fail to promote the long term employment relationship.
A similar trend has occurred in the United States as a decline in
union presence has been accompanied by increased workplace legislation and regulation. United States employers, unhappy with these increased rights, have tried to cut off access to the courts through the use
of disclaimers in handbooks and pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 292
291. See Wissler, supra note 3, at 323-24, 347-48.
292. See, e.g., Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor
Courts Come to the UnitedStates?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345 (1998); Lucille M. Ponte,
In the Shadow of Gilmer: How Post-Gilmer Legal Challenges to Pre-DisputeArbitration Agreements Point the Way Towards GreaterFairness in Employment Arbitration, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 359 (1997). See generally Steven L. Willbom et al., Employment Law: Cases and
Materials 103-23 (2d ed. 1998); Lisa Bingham, Arbitration Update, Labor and the Law: News and
Current Events from the IRRA Section on Labor and Employment Law (LEL) (Sept. 1998)
<http:/128.174.170.201/rralnewsletters/199809.html>.
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State and federal courts have experienced an explosion of employment
cases and have tried to siphon cases off into other dispute resolution
modes that are seen as less expensive and more friendly than litigation. 293 They have done so by liberally approving pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and by establishing mandatory diversion to alternative dispute resolution.2 New Zealand employers have also reacted to increased filings of personal grievances by trying to create a workforce
not subject to the ECA, by using fixed-term contracts and independent
contractors and by attempting to amend the ECA to limit or eliminate
the right to file personal grievances.
Unfortunately, none of these statutes, common law developments,
mandatory or voluntary alternative dispute resolution procedures does
or can do what negotiations and the presence of a workplace steward
could do. They do not encourage early intervention and low-level resolution of cases in a way designed to foster the larger relationship. They
bring no long-term view. They do nothing to depersonalize disputes.
They are unable to achieve agreement on what matters most - the employer and employee working together, each receiving benefits from
remaining in their relationship. In essence, all these attempts to substitute for the decline of collective bargaining and the disappearance of
union presence are merely ways of cleaning up after the divorce. They
are standards imposed on unhappy employers who feel driven to subvert
them.
III. CONCLUSION

The experience with mediation under the LRA and ECA illuminates factors that affect how disputes can be resolved. It suggests that
alternative dispute resolution methods, and mediation in particular, are
not processes wholly different from adjudication. The factors that affect
adjudication and make it less or more satisfactory - resources, access,
and the quality of the substantive law - also affect mediation. There are
many decisions to be made as to how such a system is to function.
Clearly, having a judicial system and lawyers is not inferior to mediation and is not wholly separate from mediation; it is simply an altered
iteration. Furthermore, the experience of mediation in New Zealand
suggests that collective bargaining should properly be viewed as an important form of alternative dispute resolution capable of bringing posi-

293. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
294. See id.
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tive results to the participants.
APPENDIX

ComparingPersonalGrievances Under the LRA and ECA
LABOUR RELATIONS Acr

DEFINITION OF PERSONAL
GRIEVANCE ("PG")

RIGHT TO FILE PERSONAL
GRIEVANCES

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

ACT
Unjustifiable dismissals; the
employee's employment or
conditions of employment
have been "affected to the
employee's disadvantage by
an unjustifiable action by the
employer"; that the employee
discriminated
has
been
against; that the employee
has been sexually harassed;
or that the employee has been
subject to duress in relation
to membership or nonmembership in an employees organization. See § 27.
Only union members whose All employees. See § 27(1).
work was covered by an
award or agreement See §
Unjustifiable dismissals and
"other unjustifiable detrimental actions such as sexual harassment, duress, and discrimination"; or the worker's
employment has been affected to the worker's disadvantage by an unjustifiable
action by the employer. §
209(a), 210-14.

209(d), 216.

PROCEDURE FOR PURSUING
PERSONAL GRIEVANCES

Within 60 days after being
dismissed, an employee has a
right to ask for a written
statement of the employer's
reasons. See § 38.
The employer must provide This must be provided within
the statement within 14 days. 14 days. § 38(2).
The employee or union may
request a statement in writing
of the reasons for dismissal.
See § 225.

See § 225.

PG commenced by submitting it to the employer "as
soon as practicable after the
grievance has arisen so as to
enable the employer to resolve the grievance rapidly
and as near as possible to the
point of origin. Seventh

The employee must first
submit the grievance to the
employer within 90 days.
Failure to do so means that
the employer need not consider the grievance. See §
33(2), (3); First Schedule
Nos. 2-3.

Schedule. No. 2.
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MEDIATION

If not resolved, and if the
union determined that the
grievance had substance, it
would "take the matter up
with the employer" - first
verbally and then, if necessary, by submitting a "written
statement setting out the nature of the grievance, the
facts giving rise to it, and the
remedy sought." Seventh
Schedule Nos. 4-5.
The employer then responds
within 14 days either by settling the grievance or with its
own statement as to the facts
and why it is not prepared to
settle. See Seventh Schedule
No. 6.
If unresolved, a mediator
could be assigned to "assist
employers and their representatives and workers and their
representatives to achieve and
maintain effective labour relations" and to assist the disputing parties to "solve the
dispute". § 253(1), (2)(c).
The grievance committee
would consider any evidence
and then, usually by majority
vote, decide how to resolve
the matter. Seveneth Schedule Nos. 9, 11.

If the parties could not come
to a resolution, the mediator
or committee chair made the
decision.
See
Seventh
Schedule No. 11.
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If an employee's discussions
with the employer fail to re-

solve the grievance, the employee must then submit a
written statement setting out
"the nature of the grievance,
the facts giving rise to the
grievance, and the remedy
sought." First Schedule No.
4.

The employer then may grant
the grievance or, within 14
days, "give the employee a
written response setting out
the employer's view of the
facts and remedy sought."
1Firdt Rel ,,

in. 5.

If unresolved or if the employer fails to provide a
written statement within
fourteen days, the matter may
then be filed with the Employment Tribunal. See First
Schedule No. 7(b).

The mediator provides mediation assistance. See First
Schedule § 8. "Appropriate
services that will facilitate
the mutual resolution by parties to employment contracts
of differences that arise between them;" and serves as a
"low level, informal, specialist [body] to provide speedy,
fair, and just resolution of
differences between parties to
employment contracts" when
"mutual resolution is either
inappropriate or impossible."
§ 76(b), (c).
If necessary, the mediator can
adjudicate the grievance
based on the "written statements, evidence or submissions provided by the parties,
and any other matters the
mediator thinks fit." First
Schedule No. 8.
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APPEALS

Appeal is to the Labour
Court, which could hear the
case de novo. See Seventh
Schedule Nos. 15-18.

Appeal is to the Employment
Court which considers only
issues, explanations,
and
facts presented to the Tribunal, except in special circumstances. See § 95(4).

INVOLVEMENT OF LAWYERS

Practicing lawyers are not
permitted to participate in
mediation. They may appear
before the Labour Court.

Parties appearing before the
Tribunal may be represented
by any representative whom
the party authorizes or by a
barrister or solicitor. See §
190(1).
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